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Author Institute, American Law
Title Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law : Economics of Trade Agreements, Border Instruments, and National Treasures
Imprint New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013
book jacket
Descript 1 online resource (382 pages)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
Series The American Law Institute Reporters Studies on WTO Law
The American Law Institute Reporters Studies on WTO Law
Note Intro -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- 1 The Genesis of the GATT Summary -- 1.1 The Years Before the Negotiation -- 1.2 The Negotiation -- 1.3 Property Rights of the GATT -- 1.4 What Did The GATT Framers Have in Mind? -- 2 Why the WTO? An Introduction to the Economics of Trade Agreements -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Building Blocks for a Theory of Trade Agreements -- 2.2.1 Economic Interdependence and International Externalities -- 2.2.2 Government Objectives -- 2.2.3 A Formal Representation of Government Objectives6 -- 2.2.4 Predicting Outcomes of Strategic Interaction -- 2.3 A General International Externalities Model of Trade Agreements -- 2.3.1 Imposing Minimal Structure on Government Objectives -- 2.3.2 The Benchmark Outcome: Unilateral Policy Decisions -- 2.3.3 An Efficient Trade Agreement -- 2.3.4 The Design of Trade Agreements -- Trade Agreements Are Negotiated -- Trade Agreements Must Be Self-Enforcing -- Trade Agreements Are Explicit and Incomplete -- Trade Agreements Involve Reciprocal Exchanges of Concessions -- 2.4 A Special Case: The National Market Power Model -- 2.4.1 When Free Trade Is Unilaterally Optimal -- 2.4.2 The Unilateral Incentive to Exploit National Market Power -- 2.4.3 The Basic National Market Power Model -- 2.4.4 Discussion -- The Structure of the Economy -- Do Countries Have Sufficient Market Power? -- Richer Descriptions of the Politics of Trade-Policy Formation -- The Role of Tariff Revenue -- Labeling the Government Behavior That Trade Agreements Address -- 2.4.5 Are Predictions from the National Market Power Model Compatible with the Design of the GATT? -- Border Instruments Are Regulated, But Alternative Policies Are Treated Differently -- The Emphasis on Reciprocity Border Instruments Are Regulated, But Domestic Instruments Are Not -- The Most-Favored Nation Principle -- The National Treatment Principle -- Rules Concerning Preferential Trading Agreements -- Possibilities to Escape Bindings -- Gradual Trade Liberalization -- Export Taxes Are Legal -- Subsidies Are Restricted -- Anti-dumping -- 2.5 Trade Agreements as Government Commitment Devices Vis-à-Vis Constituent Interests -- 2.6 Concluding Remarks -- 3 Border Instruments -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.1.1 The Treaty Text -- Tariff Commitments -- Quantitative Restrictions and "Other Measures" -- MFN and Exceptions -- Export Subsidies -- 3.1.2 Note on GATT 1994 -- 3.2 The Rationale for Negotiated Constraints on Traditional Instruments of Protection (Tariffs and QRs) -- 13 The Negotiating History -- The Negotiation Process -- Negotiations on Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) -- Foreign-Policy Considerations in the Negotiations -- 3.2.2 The Rationale According to Case Law -- 3.2.3 The Rationale According to Economic Theory -- 3.2.4 From Economic Theory to Interpretation of Legal Rules -- 3.3 Implementation in WTO Law: Tariffs and QRs -- 3.3.1 Key Features of the Law on Tariff Commitments -- 3.3.2 The Case Law on QRs -- 3.4 The Rationale for MFN and Its Exceptions -- 3.4.1 The Negotiating History -- 3.4.2 The Rationale According to Case Law -- 3.4.3 The Rationale According to Economic Theory -- Customs Unions, Free-Trade Agreements, and the Generalized System of Preferences -- 3.5 Implementation in WTO Law: MFN and Exceptions -- 3.5.1 MFN and Article I -- 3.5.2 Article XXIV -- 3.5.3 Special and Differential Treatment -- 3.6 The Rationale for Disciplines on Export Subsidies and Export Tariffs -- 3.6.1 The Negotiating History
3.6.2 The Rationale (or Lack Thereof) in Modern Economic Theory -- Export subsidies -- Export tariffs -- 3.7 The Case Law on Export Policies -- 3.7.1 Export Subsidies -- 3.7.2 Export Tariffs -- 3.8 Conclusion -- 4 National Treatment -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.1.1 The Text of Art. III GATT -- 4.1.2 Art. III GATT 1947, Art. III GATT 1994 -- 4.2 The Rationale for NT -- 4.2.1 The Rationale for NT in Negotiating History -- The Forum and Context of Negotiation -- The Transformation of NT -- The GATT, an (Independent) Part of the ITO. -- NT in the Various Drafts -- Summarizing the Negotiating Record -- 4.2.2 The Rationale for NT in Case Law -- 4.2.3 The Rationale for NT from the Perspective of Economics -- The Purpose and Structure of Trade Agreements -- A Digression on Policy Objectives. -- Externalities from Unilateral Decisionmaking. -- The Incompleteness of Trade Agreements. -- The Role of NT: To Filter Out Protectionist Policies -- The Efficacy of NT for Given Tariff Levels. -- The Interaction between Tariffs and Taxes. -- The Nature of the Costs of Judicial Errors. -- An Alternative View of the Role of Trade Agreements -- Summary of the Rationale of NT from an Economic Perspective -- 4.3 The Implementation of NT in Case Law -- 4.3.1 The Case Law Regarding Art. III GATT -- 4.3.2 The Legal Discipline -- Which Measures Come under the Scope of NT? -- The Right to Regulate -- Fiscal Measures -- The Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments. -- DCS Products. -- Applied So as to Afford Protection (ASATAP). -- Like Products. -- Taxation in Excess. -- Nonfiscal Instruments -- Laws, Regulations, or Requirements Affecting Sale, Offering for Sale. -- Like Products in Art. III.4GATT. -- Less Favorable Treatment. -- No Effects and No Intent Either? The Standard of Review. -- Allocation of the Burden of Proof -- Making a Prima Facie Case. -- Refuting a Prima Facie Case. -- Art. III GATT Case Law. -- 4.3.3 Exceptions to NT -- Art. IV GATT: Film -- Art. XX GATT: General Exceptions -- Art. XXI GATT: Security Exception -- 4.3.4 Critique of the Case Law -- 4.3.5 Concluding Remarks -- 4.4 How Should NT Be Interpreted? -- 4.4.1 Two Approaches to Evaluate Protection -- Interpretation XX -- Interpretation III -- Like Products. -- DCS Products. -- 4.4.2 The Difference in Outcome with the Two Approaches -- Interpretation XX Imposes Additional Restrictions for Measures Not to Constitute Illegal Protection -- The Evidentiary Burden Falls Heavier on the Complainant with Interpretation XX -- The Nature of Measures That Are Market-Like But Not Policy-Like -- 4.4.3 Which Interpretation Is Preferable? -- The List of Permissible Objectives in Art. XX GATT -- The Additional Requirements Imposed by Art. XX GATT -- The Allocation of the Burden of Proof -- Consequences for Trade Liberalization -- Concluding Discussion -- 4.4.4 Further Remarks on Interpretation III -- The Relevance of Art. III.1GATT -- The Relative Facility to Find Grounds for Complaints -- Why Not Only Policy Likeness, Why Also Market Likeness? -- The Relationship Between Like and DCS Products -- GATT Does Not Request Full International Efficiency -- Can a Measure That Violates Art. III GATT Be Justified Through Recourse to Art. XX GATT? On Evaluating Market Likeness and Protection -- Intent Versus Effect -- The Aims and Effect Test -- Taxation Based on Features of the Production Process (PPMs) -- 4.4.5 Revisiting the Leading Cases in Light of Our Proposals -- Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II -- Korea-Alcoholic Beverages -- Chile-Alcoholic Beverages -- Concluding Remarks on the Revisit to the Leading Cases -- 4.5 Principles -- Appendix -- Index
Reports work done thus far to identify improvements to the interpretation of the WTO Agreement based on a project led by the American Law Institute
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2020. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries
Link Print version: Institute, American Law Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law : Economics of Trade Agreements, Border Instruments, and National Treasures New York : Cambridge University Press,c2013 9781107038615
Subject World Trade Organization.;General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization);Foreign trade regulation.;Foreign trade regulation -- Economic aspects
Electronic books
Alt Author Horn, Henrik
Mavroidis, Petros C
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