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Author Institute, American Law
Title Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law : Economics of Trade Agreements, Border Instruments, and National Treasures
Imprint New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013
©2013
book jacket
Descript 1 online resource (382 pages)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
Series The American Law Institute Reporters Studies on WTO Law
The American Law Institute Reporters Studies on WTO Law
Note Intro -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- 1 The Genesis of the GATT Summary -- 1.1 The Years Before the Negotiation -- 1.2 The Negotiation -- 1.3 Property Rights of the GATT -- 1.4 What Did The GATT Framers Have in Mind? -- 2 Why the WTO? An Introduction to the Economics of Trade Agreements -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Building Blocks for a Theory of Trade Agreements -- 2.2.1 Economic Interdependence and International Externalities -- 2.2.2 Government Objectives -- 2.2.3 A Formal Representation of Government Objectives6 -- 2.2.4 Predicting Outcomes of Strategic Interaction -- 2.3 A General International Externalities Model of Trade Agreements -- 2.3.1 Imposing Minimal Structure on Government Objectives -- 2.3.2 The Benchmark Outcome: Unilateral Policy Decisions -- 2.3.3 An Efficient Trade Agreement -- 2.3.4 The Design of Trade Agreements -- 2.3.4.1 Trade Agreements Are Negotiated -- 2.3.4.2 Trade Agreements Must Be Self-Enforcing -- 2.3.4.3 Trade Agreements Are Explicit and Incomplete -- 2.3.4.4 Trade Agreements Involve Reciprocal Exchanges of Concessions -- 2.4 A Special Case: The National Market Power Model -- 2.4.1 When Free Trade Is Unilaterally Optimal -- 2.4.2 The Unilateral Incentive to Exploit National Market Power -- 2.4.3 The Basic National Market Power Model -- 2.4.4 Discussion -- 2.4.4.1 The Structure of the Economy -- 2.4.4.2 Do Countries Have Sufficient Market Power? -- 2.4.4.3 Richer Descriptions of the Politics of Trade-Policy Formation -- 2.4.4.4 The Role of Tariff Revenue -- 2.4.4.5 Labeling the Government Behavior That Trade Agreements Address -- 2.4.5 Are Predictions from the National Market Power Model Compatible with the Design of the GATT? -- 2.4.5.1 Border Instruments Are Regulated, But Alternative Policies Are Treated Differently -- 2.4.5.2 The Emphasis on Reciprocity
2.4.5.3 Border Instruments Are Regulated, But Domestic Instruments Are Not -- 2.4.5.4 The Most-Favored Nation Principle -- 2.4.5.5 The National Treatment Principle -- 2.4.5.6 Rules Concerning Preferential Trading Agreements -- 2.4.5.7 Possibilities to Escape Bindings -- 2.4.5.8 Gradual Trade Liberalization -- 2.4.5.9 Export Taxes Are Legal -- 2.4.5.10 Subsidies Are Restricted -- 2.4.5.11 Anti-dumping -- 2.5 Trade Agreements as Government Commitment Devices Vis-à-Vis Constituent Interests -- 2.6 Concluding Remarks -- 3 Border Instruments -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.1.1 The Treaty Text -- 3.1.1.1 Tariff Commitments -- 3.1.1.2 Quantitative Restrictions and "Other Measures" -- 3.1.1.3 MFN and Exceptions -- 3.1.1.4 Export Subsidies -- 3.1.2 Note on GATT 1994 -- 3.2 The Rationale for Negotiated Constraints on Traditional Instruments of Protection (Tariffs and QRs) -- 13 The Negotiating History -- 3.2.1.1 The Negotiation Process -- 3.2.1.2 Negotiations on Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) -- 3.2.1.3 Foreign-Policy Considerations in the Negotiations -- 3.2.2 The Rationale According to Case Law -- 3.2.3 The Rationale According to Economic Theory -- 3.2.4 From Economic Theory to Interpretation of Legal Rules -- 3.3 Implementation in WTO Law: Tariffs and QRs -- 3.3.1 Key Features of the Law on Tariff Commitments -- 3.3.2 The Case Law on QRs -- 3.4 The Rationale for MFN and Its Exceptions -- 3.4.1 The Negotiating History -- 3.4.2 The Rationale According to Case Law -- 3.4.3 The Rationale According to Economic Theory -- 3.4.3.1 Customs Unions, Free-Trade Agreements, and the Generalized System of Preferences -- 3.5 Implementation in WTO Law: MFN and Exceptions -- 3.5.1 MFN and Article I -- 3.5.2 Article XXIV -- 3.5.3 Special and Differential Treatment -- 3.6 The Rationale for Disciplines on Export Subsidies and Export Tariffs -- 3.6.1 The Negotiating History
3.6.2 The Rationale (or Lack Thereof) in Modern Economic Theory -- 3.6.2.1 Export subsidies -- 3.6.2.2 Export tariffs -- 3.7 The Case Law on Export Policies -- 3.7.1 Export Subsidies -- 3.7.2 Export Tariffs -- 3.8 Conclusion -- 4 National Treatment -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.1.1 The Text of Art. III GATT -- 4.1.2 Art. III GATT 1947, Art. III GATT 1994 -- 4.2 The Rationale for NT -- 4.2.1 The Rationale for NT in Negotiating History -- 4.2.1.1 The Forum and Context of Negotiation -- 4.2.1.2 The Transformation of NT -- 4.2.1.2.1 The GATT, an (Independent) Part of the ITO. -- 4.2.1.2.2 NT in the Various Drafts -- 4.2.1.3 Summarizing the Negotiating Record -- 4.2.2 The Rationale for NT in Case Law -- 4.2.3 The Rationale for NT from the Perspective of Economics -- 4.2.3.1 The Purpose and Structure of Trade Agreements -- 4.2.3.1.1 A Digression on Policy Objectives. -- 4.2.3.1.2 Externalities from Unilateral Decisionmaking. -- 4.2.3.1.3 The Incompleteness of Trade Agreements. -- 4.2.3.2 The Role of NT: To Filter Out Protectionist Policies -- 4.2.3.2.1 The Efficacy of NT for Given Tariff Levels. -- 4.2.3.2.2 The Interaction between Tariffs and Taxes. -- 4.2.3.2.3 The Nature of the Costs of Judicial Errors. -- 4.2.3.3 An Alternative View of the Role of Trade Agreements -- 4.2.3.4 Summary of the Rationale of NT from an Economic Perspective -- 4.3 The Implementation of NT in Case Law -- 4.3.1 The Case Law Regarding Art. III GATT -- 4.3.2 The Legal Discipline -- 4.3.2.1 Which Measures Come under the Scope of NT? -- 4.3.2.2 The Right to Regulate -- 4.3.2.3 Fiscal Measures -- 4.3.2.3.1 The Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments. -- 4.3.2.3.2 DCS Products. -- 4.3.2.3.3 Applied So as to Afford Protection (ASATAP). -- 4.3.2.3.4 Like Products. -- 4.3.2.3.5 Taxation in Excess. -- 4.3.2.4 Nonfiscal Instruments -- 4.3.2.4.1 Laws, Regulations, or Requirements
4.3.2.4.2 Affecting Sale, Offering for Sale. -- 4.3.2.4.3 Like Products in Art. III.4GATT. -- 4.3.2.4.4 Less Favorable Treatment. -- 4.3.2.4.5 No Effects and No Intent Either? The Standard of Review. -- 4.3.2.5 Allocation of the Burden of Proof -- 4.3.2.5.1 Making a Prima Facie Case. -- 4.3.2.5.2 Refuting a Prima Facie Case. -- 4.3.2.5.3 Art. III GATT Case Law. -- 4.3.3 Exceptions to NT -- 4.3.3.1 Art. IV GATT: Film -- 4.3.3.2 Art. XX GATT: General Exceptions -- 4.3.3.3 Art. XXI GATT: Security Exception -- 4.3.4 Critique of the Case Law -- 4.3.5 Concluding Remarks -- 4.4 How Should NT Be Interpreted? -- 4.4.1 Two Approaches to Evaluate Protection -- 4.4.1.1 Interpretation XX -- 4.4.1.2 Interpretation III -- 4.4.1.2.1 Like Products. -- 4.4.1.2.2 DCS Products. -- 4.4.2 The Difference in Outcome with the Two Approaches -- 4.4.2.1 Interpretation XX Imposes Additional Restrictions for Measures Not to Constitute Illegal Protection -- 4.4.2.2 The Evidentiary Burden Falls Heavier on the Complainant with Interpretation XX -- 4.4.2.3 The Nature of Measures That Are Market-Like But Not Policy-Like -- 4.4.3 Which Interpretation Is Preferable? -- 4.4.3.1 The List of Permissible Objectives in Art. XX GATT -- 4.4.3.2 The Additional Requirements Imposed by Art. XX GATT -- 4.4.3.3 The Allocation of the Burden of Proof -- 4.4.3.4 Consequences for Trade Liberalization -- 4.4.3.5 Concluding Discussion -- 4.4.4 Further Remarks on Interpretation III -- 4.4.4.1 The Relevance of Art. III.1GATT -- 4.4.4.2 The Relative Facility to Find Grounds for Complaints -- 4.4.4.3 Why Not Only Policy Likeness, Why Also Market Likeness? -- 4.4.4.4 The Relationship Between Like and DCS Products -- 4.4.4.5 GATT Does Not Request Full International Efficiency -- 4.4.4.6 Can a Measure That Violates Art. III GATT Be Justified Through Recourse to Art. XX GATT?
4.4.4.7 On Evaluating Market Likeness and Protection -- 4.4.4.8 Intent Versus Effect -- 4.4.4.9 The Aims and Effect Test -- 4.4.4.10 Taxation Based on Features of the Production Process (PPMs) -- 4.4.5 Revisiting the Leading Cases in Light of Our Proposals -- 4.4.5.1 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II -- 4.4.5.2 Korea-Alcoholic Beverages -- 4.4.5.3 Chile-Alcoholic Beverages -- 4.4.5.4 Concluding Remarks on the Revisit to the Leading Cases -- 4.5 Principles -- Appendix -- Index
Reports work done thus far to identify improvements to the interpretation of the WTO Agreement based on a project led by the American Law Institute
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2020. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries
Link Print version: Institute, American Law Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law : Economics of Trade Agreements, Border Instruments, and National Treasures New York : Cambridge University Press,c2013 9781107038615
Subject World Trade Organization.;General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization);Foreign trade regulation.;Foreign trade regulation -- Economic aspects
Electronic books
Alt Author Horn, Henrik
Mavroidis, Petros C
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