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作者 Axelrod, Mark Lawrence
書名 Saving institutional benefits: Path dependence in international law
國際標準書號 9780549484929
book jacket
說明 420 p
附註 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-02, Section: A, page: 0740
Adviser: Joseph Grieco
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2008
This project considers the pace of change in international law, focusing on sources of evolution and stagnation. I attempt to determine why negotiators defer to existing law in some situations and not others. To that end, this study explores country preferences towards the status quo in international negotiations
I hypothesize that deference to existing international law is more likely under four conditions. First, countries that have experienced a decline in relative power should promote deference to existing international law. Second, declining powers that have allowed private access by their citizens to existing international institutions should have greater domestic political pressure to protect those arrangements. Third, this relationship should be particularly strong if interested citizens are able to participate (perhaps through the ratification process) in subsequent negotiations. Finally, more complex negotiations (i.e., those including more participants) should result in greater deference to existing international law
The project tests these hypotheses with statistical analysis on a random sample of multilateral treaties, as well as case studies of negotiation practices in the United States, India, and the European Union. The analysis supports all four conjectures, and notes interactions between them
School code: 0066
DDC
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 69-02A
主題 Law
Political Science, General
Political Science, International Law and Relations
0398
0615
0616
Alt Author Duke University. Political Science
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