MARC 主機 00000nam  2200373   4500 
001    AAI3122199 
005    20050526085439.5 
008    050526s2003                        eng d 
020    0496695494 
035    (UnM)AAI3122199 
040    UnM|cUnM 
100 1  Brenner, Carl Noakes 
245 10 Agency, institutions, and the enduring pattern of American
       civil-military relations 
300    386 p 
500    Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-
       02, Section: A, page: 0675 
500    Adviser: Andrew Bennett 
502    Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2003 
520    Who prevails when American political leaders and military 
       officers disagree? This study develops and tests two 
       explanations drawn from prominent streams of civil-
       military relations thought. Revised Structural (RS) theory
       argues that changes in political, military, and societal 
       actors' perceptions of external and internal threats 
       explain variations in civilian control. Agency in 
       Institutions (All) theory predicts that civilians' 
       influence over military behavior depends on arrangements 
       of policy preferences among political and military actors.
       It identifies four specific patterns in how these 
       arrangements affect civilian leaders' ability to shape the
       incentives for military officers' behavior by threatening 
       punishments, promising rewards, and monitoring military 
520    The structured qualitative test examines the theories' 
       predictions about civilians' ability to influence military
       behavior in six American civil-military disputes: military
       strategy in the War of 1812, military strategy in the 
       Civil War, racial integration of the armed forces, 
       military strategy in the Korean War, gays in the military,
       and military involvement in Bosnia. The historical cases 
       provide far stronger support for All's predictions about 
       both causal processes and outcomes than RS's 
520    The findings offer important implications for both 
       research and policy. Contrary to prescriptions for 
       objective control, civilian leaders should forge political
       unity and aggressively employ incentives to ensure 
       military policy supports national policy. By sustaining 
       this unity over time, civilians can influence the officer 
       corps' policy preferences and not just their short-term 
       behavior. Civilians can frequently improve control by 
       fostering intra-military rivalries; however, these 
       rivalries' may impair military effectiveness. The cases 
       also suggest that civil-military relations are improved 
       when civilians control an effective, independent means of 
       gathering and assessing information about the military. 
       All's logic suggests that the United States' history of 
       freedom from direct military threats to democracy can 
       largely be attributed to American civilians' enduring 
       consensus on core democratic principles that reject extra-
       legal military intervention 
590    School code: 0076 
590    DDC 
650  4 Political Science, General 
650  4 History, United States 
650  4 Political Science, Public Administration 
690    0615 
690    0337 
690    0617 
710 20 Georgetown University 
773 0  |tDissertation Abstracts International|g65-02A 
856 40 |u