MARC 主機 00000nam  2200325   4500 
001    AAI3170025 
005    20120910130255.5 
008    120910s2004    ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d 
020    9780542061912 
035    (UMI)AAI3170025 
040    UMI|cUMI 
100 1  Charoensiriwath, Chayakrit 
245 10 Competition in supply chain with service contributions 
300    219 p 
500    Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-
       03, Section: B, page: 1656 
500    Director: Jye-Chyi Lu 
502    Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgia Institute of Technology, 2004 
520    We study the supply chain with two manufacturers producing
       competing products and selling them through a common 
       retailer. The two manufacturers must decide on the 
       wholesale price and the level of service they plan to 
       provide to the consumer. Each firm are assumed to optimize
       only its own profit (uncoordinated). The consumer demand 
       depends on two factors: (1) retail price, and (2) service 
       level provided by the manufacturer. We extend the study on
       this basic model in three directions. First, we explore 
       the role of bargaining power in supply chain strategic 
       interactions. We derive and compare equilibrium solutions 
       for the supply chain under three different scenarios (e.g.,
       Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and 
       Vertical Nash). Second, we extend the framework to study 
       multi-period model. In this model, demand also depends on 
       the past period retail prices and service levels, as well 
       as current prices and service levels. Game-theoretic 
       approaches and dynamic system and control theory are used 
       as tools to model the problem. Finally, we examine a 
       single period problem with stochastic demand. When demand 
       is uncertain, the retailer faces a newsvendor-type 
       problem. In our model, the newsvendor must manage two 
       competing products against a price-dependent demand. We 
       derive an expression for the newsvendor's optimal retail 
       prices. Next, we provide an algorithm to search for the 
       equilibrium wholesale price and service level, given that 
       the manufacturers know the retailer's reaction function. 
       Some numerical examples are provided 
590    School code: 0078 
650  4 Business Administration, General 
650  4 Engineering, Industrial 
690    0310 
690    0546 
710 2  Georgia Institute of Technology 
773 0  |tDissertation Abstracts International|g66-03B 
856 40 |u