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作者 Faro, David
書名 Causal time compression: The influence of causal beliefs on judgments of elapsed time
國際標準書號 9780542710315
book jacket
說明 91 p
附註 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1821
Advisers: Reig Hastie; Ann L. McGill
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2006
The present research examines the use of perceived causality as a cue to judgments of elapsed time between two events. Time judgments are found to be systematically shorter between events that are perceived to be causally related, and a stronger perception of causality results in shorter judgments of elapsed time. This tendency, "causal time compression," holds for events in the historical past spanning years of real time and for events experienced in the laboratory in the space of a few minutes
The dissertation is composed of three parts. In Part I, three studies examining elapsed time judgments for historical events document the basic phenomenon. These studies test the causal time compression hypothesis by contrasting pairs of events that are causally related to pairs of events that are not causally related and by manipulating strength of causal beliefs holding pair content constant
In Part II three studies examine the proposed process more closely. The role of causal strength in shortening time estimates is tested against two alternative accounts, associative strength and perceived similarity. Next, a boundary condition for this effect is examined by manipulating the type of causal relationship that links the events. The time compression effect persists for dissipative causal relationships; however, time estimates are not shorter for stable causes. These results suggest that the causality-time heuristic is driven by a mental model of causality that is based on naive physics, in which the force of a cause dissipates with time. A further test of the causality-heuristic account shows that people with a greater tendency to rely on heuristics for judgment show a greater tendency to rely on strong perceived causality to make shorter time estimates
Part III explores the role of causal time compression in personally experienced durations, rather than historical public events. The studies in this part show that people give shorter time estimates for an identical product experience if they believe the product is highly effective (versus weak). These studies also demonstrate the extremity of the effects of causal beliefs on time judgments, occurring for durations experienced personally and only moments before the judgment
School code: 0330
DDC
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 67-05A
主題 Business Administration, Marketing
Psychology, Clinical
Psychology, Cognitive
0338
0622
0633
Alt Author The University of Chicago
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