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作者 Lindstaedt, Rene
書名 Three essays on the political economy of separation-of-powers institutions
國際標準書號 9780542714757
book jacket
說明 108 p
附註 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1898
Adviser: Gary J. Miller
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Washington University in St. Louis, 2006
The first essay addresses the question of how presidents use distributive politics to attract and maintain the support of voters by empirically testing two competing theories about recipients of federal funds. According to the swing voter theory, independents decide the outcome of elections and are therefore the main beneficiaries of distributive benefits. The core supporter theory argues that targeting swing voters is a risky strategy that alienates core constituencies, which is why politicians concentrate their reelection efforts on their core constituency. The two theories are tested with state- and county-level data on New Deal grants using multilevel statistical models. The empirical analysis shows that Roosevelt targeted core Democratic supporters, but not swing voters
The second essay studies three theories of presidential vote buying. According to the partisan theory of vote buying, presidents build congressional coalitions around fellow party members. The committee-centered theory, on the other hand, states that presidential vote buying targets congressional committees because of their role as legislative agenda setters. The preference-based theory argues that presidents target ideologically proximate legislators as a means of rewarding past support and as an incentive for future support. The theories are tested with congressional district data on New Deal grants. The empirical analysis shows that Roosevelt followed a two-pronged strategy, targeting congressional committees as well as rewarding legislators with similar ideological preferences
The third essay studies the effect a country's party system has on the principal-agent relationship between legislators and bureaucratic agents. The focus is on how a country's party system affects the legislature's choice over monitoring regimes, which are used to control bureaucratic agents. Two game-theoretic models, a weak and a strong party model, are compared to assess the effect different party systems have on monitoring. The models each feature two legislators who bargain over the provision of bureaucratic monitoring. The analysis shows that only when party organization is quite strong are legislators in strong party systems more successful at bargaining than legislators in weak party systems
School code: 0252
DDC
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 67-05A
主題 Political Science, General
0615
Alt Author Washington University in St. Louis
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