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作者 Peaker, Darin W
書名 Locke's direct realism
國際標準書號 9780494121054
book jacket
說明 201 p
附註 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-02, Section: A, page: 0590
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Western Ontario (Canada), 2005
A classic objection to Locke is that his theory of perception entails the external world is shut away behind a "veil" of subjective ideas. This dissertation will challenge this representationalist interpretation
This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter examines the representationalist arguments and concludes that they are less strong than commonly supposed. Most importantly, I argue that neither Locke's position that ideas are the objects of the understanding, nor his position that we only know what is present to our mind, precludes perceiving the external world
The second chapter examines the most extensive challenge to the representationalist reading to date---John Yolton's direct realist interpretation. Yolton's reading turns on ascribing to Locke Arnauld's theory that external objects are present to the understanding when they are known or perceived. I argue that Yolton both fails to persuade that Locke follows Arnauld, and that he fails to appreciate the inherent weaknesses of Arnauld's position. Yolton's account therefore fails as a viable alternative
The third chapter is my own argument for a direct realist Locke. I argue the main competing interpretations of Locke's theory of substratum---the bare particular, and real essence interpretations---can be largely reconciled if Locke is a direct realist. Moreover, they can be reconciled in such a way as to remedy the worst defects of each theory. A direct realist Locke thus renders the difficult problem of substratum tractable. This fact is a good reason to interpret Locke as a direct realist
School code: 0784
DDC
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 67-02A
主題 Philosophy
0422
Alt Author The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
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