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作者 Brosnan, Kevin
書名 Evolutionary theory and the autonomy of ethics
國際標準書號 9780542887864
book jacket
說明 130 p
附註 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-09, Section: A, page: 3429
Adviser: Elliott Sober
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2006
In chapter 1, I develop of clear picture of what evolutionary theory is and of how the causal force of natural selection operates. I argue that the implausibility of probabilistic modus tollens compels us to use likelihood ratios in testing the degree to which competing evolutionary hypotheses are differentially supported by an observation. However, I argue that this requires information---e.g., about ancestral trait values---that is difficult, if not impossible, to acquire. We can often surmount this difficulty by changing the question we seek to address. However, I argue that the evolutionary explanations for traits that are universal within and unique to a given species cannot, in principle, be tested
In chapter 2, I the argument that Lewontin's "quasi-independence" criterion must be satisfied for any trait to evolve by natural selection, and that, since moral beliefs are traits that fail to satisfy it, they cannot be explained by natural selection. I argue that a proper understanding of Lewontin's criterion does not have this implication
Chapter 3 represents a change of direction in which I assume for the sake of argument that our moral beliefs were produced by natural selection. I consider arguments according to which our moral beliefs are probably false or unjustified, since there were formed independently of presumptive moral facts. As I demonstrate using Bayses' Theorem, these arguments use an inductive form of a genetic argument that (though it avoids the genetic fallacy) is nevertheless mistaken
In chapter 4, I argue that Moore's naturalistic fallacy does not rule out the possibility that moral predicates and natural predicates refer to the same property. I also argue that on a reasonable view of deductive validity, Hume',s thesis that 'is' does not deductively imply 'ought' is mistaken. I also consider (1) an argument that seeks to derive a moral 'ought' form an 'is', concluding it fails to achieve this aim, and (2) an argument according to which certain natural facts suffice to render certain moral beliefs justified. I argued against this position, claiming that the sought after justification requires a normative assumption
School code: 0262
DDC
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 67-09A
主題 Philosophy
0422
Alt Author The University of Wisconsin - Madison
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