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作者 Grossi, Davide, author
書名 Judgment aggregation : a primer / Davide Grossi, Gabriella Pigozzi
出版項 [San Rafael, California] : Morgan & Claypool Publishers, [2014]
國際標準書號 9781627050883
1627050884
國際標準號碼 10.2200/S00559ED1V01Y201312AIM027
book jacket
說明 1 online resource (xvii, 133 pages)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
系列 Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning, 1939-4616 ; #27
Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning ; #27. 1939-4608
附註 Online resource; title from PDF title page (Morgan & Claypool, viewed on April 21, 2014)
Includes bibliographical references (pages 111-127) and index
1. Logic meets social choice theory -- 1.1 A concise history of social choice theory -- 1.1.1 The early history -- 1.1.2 Modern social choice theory -- 1.2 A new type of aggregation -- 1.2.1 From the doctrinal paradox to the discursive dilemma -- 1.2.2 Preference aggregation and judgment aggregation -- 1.3 Further topics
2. Basic concepts -- 2.1 Preliminaries -- 2.1.1 Agendas in propositional logic -- 2.1.2 Judgment sets and profiles -- 2.1.3 Aggregation functions -- 2.1.4 Examples: aggregation rules -- 2.2 Agenda conditions -- 2.2.1 How interconnected is an agenda? -- 2.2.2 Comparing agenda conditions -- 2.3 Aggregation conditions -- 2.3.1 How should an aggregation function behave? -- 2.3.2 On the meaning of the aggregation conditions -- 2.4 Further topics -- 2.4.1 Abstract aggregation -- 2.4.2 General logics
3. Impossibility -- 3.1 What is the majority rule like? -- 3.1.1 Properties of propositionwise majority -- 3.1.2 Characterizing propositionwise majority -- 3.2 An impossibility theorem -- 3.2.1 Winning coalitions -- 3.2.2 Winning coalitions as ultrafilters -- 3.2.3 Dictators -- 3.2.4 The theorem -- 3.3 (Ultra)filters, dictators and oligarchs -- 3.3.1 Impossibility of non-oligarchic aggregation -- 3.3.2 Proof: from ultrafilters to filters -- 3.3.3 Impossibility via (ultra)filters -- 3.4 Further topics -- 3.4.1 Other impossibility results -- 3.4.2 Infinite agendas and infinite voters -- 3.4.3 Judgment aggregation vs. preference aggregation
4. Coping with impossibility -- 4.1 Relaxing universal domain -- 4.1.1 Unidimensional alignment -- 4.1.2 Value-restriction -- 4.2 Relaxing the output conditions -- 4.2.1 Abstention -- 4.2.2 Quota rules -- 4.3 Relaxing independence -- 4.3.1 The premise-based approach -- 4.3.2 The sequential priority approach -- 4.3.3 The distance-based rules -- 4.4 Further topics -- 4.4.1 More domain restrictions -- 4.4.2 Dropping consistency -- 4.4.3 Other distance-based rules -- 4.4.4 Judgment aggregation and abstract argumentation
5. Manipulability -- 5.1 Types of manipulation -- 5.1.1 Agenda manipulation -- 5.1.2 Vote manipulation -- 5.1.3 Manipulability: definition and characterization -- 5.1.4 Sincere and insincere manipulation -- 5.2 Non-manipulable aggregation: impossibility -- 5.2.1 Auxiliary results -- 5.2.2 The impossibility theorem -- 5.3 Further topics: manipulation beyond impossibility results -- 5.3.1 The possibility of non-manipulable aggregation -- 5.3.2 Strategy-proof judgment aggregation -- 5.3.3 Complexity as a safeguard against manipulation
6. Aggregation rules -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Rules based on the majoritarian judgment set -- 6.3 Rules based on the weighted majoritarian judgment set -- 6.4 Rules based on the removal or change of individual judgments -- 6.5 Further topics
7. Deliberation -- 7.1 Deliberation and opinion pooling -- 7.1.1 Probabilistic judgments -- 7.1.2 A stochastic model of deliberation -- 7.1.3 Opinion pooling and judgment aggregation -- 7.2 Deliberation as judgment transformation -- 7.2.1 Deliberation and voting -- 7.2.2 Judgment transformation functions -- 7.2.3 Examples of transformation functions -- 7.3 Limits of judgment transformation -- 7.3.1 Conditions on transformation functions -- 7.3.2 An impossibility result -- 7.4 Further topics and open issues
Bibliography -- Authors' biographies -- Index
Judgment aggregation is a mathematical theory of collective decision-making. It concerns the methods whereby individual opinions about logically interconnected issues of interest can, or cannot, be aggregated into one collective stance. Aggregation problems have traditionally been of interest for disciplines like economics and the political sciences, as well as philosophy, where judgment aggregation itself originates from, but have recently captured the attention of disciplines like computer science, artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Judgment aggregation has emerged in the last decade as a unifying paradigm for the formalization and understanding of aggregation problems. Still, no comprehensive presentation of the theory is available to date. This Synthesis Lecture aims at filling this gap presenting the key motivations, results, abstractions and techniques underpinning it
鏈接 Print version: Grossi, Davide. Judgment aggregation. San Rafael : Morgan & Claypool, 2014 1627050876 (OCoLC)868276280
主題 Social choice -- Mathematical models
Group decision making -- Mathematical models
Aggregation operators
Artificial intelligence
POLITICAL SCIENCE -- General
Social choice
PSYCHOLOGY -- Social Psychology. bisacsh
Aggregation operators. fast (OCoLC)fst00800256
Artificial intelligence. fast (OCoLC)fst00817247
Group decision making -- Mathematical models. fast (OCoLC)fst00948379
Social choice -- Mathematical models. fast (OCoLC)fst01122341
judgment aggregation
collective decision-making
logic
social choice theory
computational social choice
preference aggregation
voting paradoxes
aggregation rules
impossibility results
manipulability
ultrafilters
opinion pooling
deliberation
Electronic books
Electronic books
Alt Author Pigozzi, Gabriella, author
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