Author Quint, Daniel
Title Essays on pricing in strategic settings
book jacket
Descript 113 p
Note Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-06, Section: A, page: 2595
Adviser: Paul Milgrom
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2007
I model a number of multi-player strategic environments, and examine the effects of market structure, information, and inference on the prices that are realized in equilibrium. I present a theoretical model of patent pools in a setting with a single core technology with many possible implementations, and show that pooling of patents which are essential to the technology leads to lower prices and higher welfare, while pooling of patents which are not essential, even when they are complements, can be welfare-positive or welfare-negative. I analyze a class of two-bidder common-value auctions, and show that a bidder prefers to appear well-informed when his private information is independent of his opponent's, but prefers to appear poorly-informed when his information is closely related to his opponent's. Finally, I consider the problem of statistical inference in private-value ascending auctions; I show that, given whatever historical data has been observed, the seller's expected revenue and the revenue-maximizing reserve price are decreasing in the degree of correlation between bidders' values, and calculate upper and lower bounds on both quantities
School code: 0212
DDC
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 68-06A
Subject Economics, Theory
0511
Alt Author Stanford University