作者 Macera Parra, Rosario Claudia
書名 Essays on reference-dependent preferences
國際標準書號 9781124141220
book jacket
說明 91 p
附註 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-09, Section: A, page: 3372
Advisers: Botond Koszegi; Matthew Rabin
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2010
This dissertation consists of two chapters exploring the economic implications of reference-dependent preferences over incentive design and belief formation
The first chapter studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives in a repeated moral hazard model. Beside consumption utility, reference-dependent agents experience utility from changes in their expectations about present and future income caused by the performance measure realization. In contrast to the prediction with classical preferences but consistent with real-world contracts, this paper shows that if consumption utility is not too concave and if changes in expectations about present income carries sufficiently larger weight in utility than changes in expectations about future income, the optimal contract defers all present incentives into future payments by setting a present fixed wage. Despite this prediction, I further prove that several standard features of the contract with classical preferences---no rents to the agent, conditions to achieve first-best cost and non-optimality of random contracts---still hold
The second chapter studies the temporal path of subjective beliefs when a reference-dependent agent who experiences standard anticipatory utility and utility from changes in these anticipatory feelings waits T periods for a binary outcome realization. Following the optimal beliefs literature, in each period the agent chooses a belief about her likelihood of success to maximize her intertemporal utility. Consistent with the empirical evidence, the model predicts that optimism decreases as the pay-off date approaches if the outcome is important enough or if the agent is sufficiently loss averse. Intuitively, when the pay-off date is distant disappointment is less salient than the joy of hoping favorable outcomes; as the realization date gets closer, however, the threat of disappointment becomes important. Applying the model to the optimal timing of productivity bonuses, I find these should be granted as frequently as possible because optimism acts as a non-pecuniary motivator that allows the principal to induce the desired effort path at a cheaper expected cost
School code: 0028
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 71-09A
主題 Economics, Theory
0511
Alt Author University of California, Berkeley. Economics