書名 The natural resources trap : private investment without public commitment / edited by William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger
出版項 Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2010
國際標準書號 9780262013796 (hbk. : alk. paper)
0262013797 (hbk. : alk. paper)
book jacket
館藏地 索書號 處理狀態 OPAC 訊息 條碼
 歐美所圖書館  333.7 N2194ho 2010    在架上  -  30500101488685
說明 xiv, 519 p. : ill ; 24 cm
附註 Includes bibliographical references and index
Contracts and investment in natural resources / William Hogan, Federico Sturzenegger, and Laurence Tai -- Petroleum contracts : what does contract theory tell us? / Philippe Aghion and Luzía Quesada -- Sovereign theft : theory and evidence about sovereign default and expropriation / Michael Tomz and Mark L.J. Wright -- A resource belief curse? Oil and individualism / Rafael Di Tella, Juan Dubra, and Robert MacCulloch -- Optimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation / Eduardo Engel and Ronald Fischer -- Denying the temptation to GRAB / Nils Wernerfelt and Richard Zeckhauser -- Dealing with expropriations : general guidelines for oil production contracts / Roberto Rigobon -- Pricing expropriation risk in natural resource contracts : a real options approach / Eduardo S. Schwartz and Anders B. Trolle -- Credibility, commitment, and regulation : ex ante price caps and ex post interventions / Dieter Helm -- Hydrocarbon policy, shocks, and the collective imagination : what went wrong in Bolivia? / Fernando H. Navajas -- Urgency and betrayal : three attempts to foster private investment in Argentina's oil industry / Nicolás Gadano -- The political economy of oil contract renegotiation in Venezuela / Osmel Manzano and Francisco Monaldi -- Epilogue : Populism and natural resources workshop / Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani
"Volatility in commodity prices has been accompanied by perpetual renegotiation of contracts between private investors in natural resource production and the governments of states with mineral and energy wealth. When prices skyrocket, governments want a larger share of revenues, sometimes to the point of nationalization or expropriation; when prices fall, larger state participation becomes a burden and the private sector is called back in. Recent and newsworthy changes in the price of oil (which fell from an all-time high of $147 in mid-2008 to $40 by year's end) are notable for their speed and the steepness of their rise and fall, but the up-and-down pattern itself is not unusual. If the unpredictability of commodity prices is so predictable, why do contracts not allow for this with mechanisms that would provide a more stable commercial framework?
In The Natural Resources Trap, top scholars address this question in terms of both theory and practice. Theoretical contributions range across a number of fields, from contract theory to public finance, and treat topics that include taxation, royalties, and expropriation cycles. Case studies examine experiences in the U.K., Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, and other parts of the world."--pub. desc
鏈接 Electronic resource $z 9780262296823
主題 Natural resources -- Government policy
Natural resources -- Law and legislation
Investments, Foreign
Public-private sector cooperation
Alt Author Hogan, William W
Sturzenegger, Federico