Author Komives, Kristin
Title Water, Electricity, and the Poor : Who Benefits from Utility Subsidies?
Imprint Washington : World Bank Publications, 2005
©2005
book jacket
Descript 1 online resource (306 pages)
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Note Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations and Acronyms -- 1 Introduction -- Infrastructure Services Are Important to Economies and Households -- Many Still Lack Access to Improved Water and Electricity Services -- Are Subsidies the Answer? -- Utility Subsidies Are Also Redistributive Mechanisms -- Objective of This Book: Assessing the Targeting Performance of Subsidies -- 2 A Typology of Consumer Utility Subsidies -- What Types of Consumer Utility Subsidies Exist? -- How Are Subsidies Funded? -- How Prevalent Are Different Types of Subsidies? -- Why Are Subsidies So Prevalent? -- Summary -- 3 The Rationale for Subsidizing Services for the Poor -- Subsidies Are Instruments of Sectoral Policy -- Utilities Subsidies Are Also Instruments of Broader Social Policy -- Summary -- 4 The Determinants of Targeting Performance: A Conceptual Framework -- Data and Methodology -- Conceptual Framework: The Determinants of Subsidy Performance -- Summary -- 5 The Targeting Performance of Quantity-Based Subsidies -- A Snapshot of Performance: Quantity-Targeted Subsidies Are Regressive -- The Access Handicap: Only Connected Households Are Potential Beneficiaries -- Metering: A Necessary Condition for Quantity Targeting -- Targeting Potential: Do the Poor Consume Less Than the Rich? -- Beneficiary Targeting in Practice: No One Is Excluded -- Benefit Targeting in Practice: High-Volume Consumers Receive Larger Subsidies -- Summary -- 6 Can the Targeting Performance of Consumption Subsidies Be Improved? -- Improvement of Subsidy Performance by Modifying Tariff Design? -- Beyond Quantity Targeting: Can Subsidy Performance Be Improved with Administrative Selection? -- Beyond Private Connections: How Do Alternative Forms of Consumption Subsidies Perform? -- Summary -- 7 The Targeting Performance of Connection Subsidies
Universal Connection Subsidies: Subsidy Performance If All Who Could Benefit Actually Did -- Targeted Connection Subsidies: Can Performance Be Improved? -- Assumptions in the Simulations: Will They Hold in Practice? -- Subsidy Funding and Implementation: How Do They Affect Distributional Incidence? -- Summary -- 8 Consumer Utility Subsidies as Instruments of Social Policy -- What Is the Benefit Targeting Performance of Utility Subsidies Relative to Other Transfer Mechanisms? -- What Is the Distribution of Subsidy Benefits Relative to Income? -- Do Subsidies Provide Material Benefits for Poor Recipients? -- To What Extent Do Subsidies Contribute to Poverty Reduction? -- Summary -- 9 Beyond Subsidies-Other Means of Achieving Sectoral Goals -- Cost Reduction Measures: Bringing Down the Cost Recovery Threshold? -- Billing and Payment Systems: Matching the Cash Flow of the Poor? -- Legal and Administrative Barriers: What Removing Nonprice Obstacles Does to Serving the Poor -- Summary -- 10 Conclusions -- How Prevalent Are Utility Subsidies? -- How Do Standard Quantity-Targeted Utility Subsidies Perform? -- Why Do Quantity-Targeted Utility Subsidies Perform So Poorly? -- Do Quantity-Targeted Subsidies Perform Differently for Water and Electricity? -- Is It Possible to Improve the Design of Quantity-Targeted Subsidies? -- Are the Alternatives to Quantity Targeting Any Better? -- Do Connection Subsidies Perform Better Than Consumption Subsidies? -- Do These Conclusions Vary across Geographical Regions? -- Are Utility Subsidies as Effective as Other Measures of Social Protection? -- Do Utility Subsidies Have a Material Impact on Disposable Incomes? -- Are There Viable Alternatives to Utility Subsidies? -- Appendixes -- Appendix A: Case Background -- Appendix B: Electricity: Coverage, Expenditure, and Consumption
Appendix C: Water: Coverage, Expenditure, and Consumption -- Appendix D: Electricity: Consumption Subsidy Data -- Appendix E: Water: Consumption Subsidy Data -- Appendix F: Water: Connection Subsidy Data -- Appendix G: Burden Limit: Consumption Subsidy Data -- Appendix H: Increasing Block Tariff Structures -- Bibliography -- Index -- Boxes -- 2.1 Quantity-Targeted Subsidies in Tariff Structures -- 2.2 Indicative Cost-Recovery Ranges for Water Services -- 2.3 Indicative Cost-Recovery Ranges for Electricity -- 3.1 Methodologies for Measuring Willingness to Pay -- 5.1 The Challenge of Comparing Consumption Levels of the Rich and the Poor -- 6.1 Funding Colombia's Geographically Targeted Subsidy Scheme -- 6.2 Chile's ficha CAS, Reducing the Cost of Means Testing -- 6.3 Metering and Water Subsidy Performance in Kathmandu -- 7.1 Determinants of Targeting Performance -- 8.1 An Introduction to Gini Coefficients -- 8.2 Poverty Reduction Effect of the Honduran Electricity Subsidy -- Figures -- 2.1 Who Ultimately Captures Government-Funded Subsidies to Utilities? -- 3.1 Willingness to Pay for Water against Full Cost Tariff in Central America -- 3.2 Willingness to Pay for Water Supply against Current Tariff in Dehra Dun, India -- 3.3 Monthly Residential Electricity Expenditure Patterns by Region -- 3.4 Monthly Residential Water Expenditure Patterns by Region -- 3.5 Affordability of Full Cost Charges for Utility Services in Urban Areas -- 4.1 Decomposing Subsidy Performance -- 5.1 Measures of Beneficiary and Benefit Incidence of Quantity-Targeted Subsidies -- 5.2 Effect of Poverty Assumption on Benefit Targeting Performance Indicator -- 5.3 Average Monthly Electricity Consumption per Household, by Quintile -- 5.4 Electricity Consumption among Poor and Nonpoor Households in Guatemala -- 5.5 Average Water Consumption per Household by Quintile
5.6 Effect of Minimum Consumption Rules and Fixed Charges on Average Price Paid with an Increasing Block Tariff at Different Consumption Levels -- 5.7 Access Factors versus Subsidy Design Factors in Quantity-Targeted Subsidies -- 6.1 Relationship between Strata (Assigned by Housing Quality) and Income Deciles in Bogota, Colombia -- 6.2a Benefit and Beneficiary Incidence of Water Consumption Subsidies -- 6.2b Benefit and Beneficiary Incidence of Electricity Consumption Subsidies -- 6.3a Water: Access Factors versus Subsidy Design Factors in Modified IBTs and Subsidies Using Administrative Selection -- 6.3b Electricity: Access Factors versus Subsidy Design Factors in Modified IBTs and Subsidies Using Administrative Selection -- 7.1 Performance of Simulated Universal Connection Subsidies -- 7.2 Performance of Connection Subsidies If 50 Percent of Poor Households Choose Not to Connect -- 7.3 Distributive Effect of the Cargo SUMA -- 8.1 Inequality in the Distribution of Income versus the Distribution of the Electricity Subsidy in Indian States -- 8.2 Average Consumption Subsidy to the Poor as a Percentage of Average Income of the Poor -- Tables -- 1.1 Percentage of the Population with Access to Improved Water Supply, Sanitation, and Electricity (and Percentage with a Household Water Connection) -- 2.1 Typology of Consumer Utility Subsidies -- 2.2 Summary of Evidence on Price and Income Elasticity -- 2.3 Overview of Average Water Tariffs and Probable Degree of Cost Recovery -- 2.4 Overview of IBT Tariff Structures for Residential Water Customers -- 2.5 Overview of Average Electricity Tariffs and Probable Degree of Cost Recovery -- 2.6 Overview of IBT Tariff Structures for Residential Electricity Customers -- 2.7 Summary of Prevalence of Different Types of Subsidies in Water and Electricity -- 2.8 Capital Intensity and Asset Lives for Utility Services
3.1 Estimated Cost Ranges for Subsistence Service Levels (US) -- 3.2 Applicability of Arguments for Transfers in Kind across Different Goods -- 3.3 Budget Shares for Different Categories of Goods in Africa (Percentage of Household Budget) -- 3.4 Pseudo Income Elasticities for Different Categories of Goods in Africa -- 4.1 Determinants of Consumption Subsidy Performance -- 4.2 Residential Electricity and Water Tariff Structures in Cape Verde, 2001 -- 4.3 Decomposition of Determinants of Subsidy Performance in Cape Verde -- 4.4 Determinants of Connection Subsidy Performance Indicators -- 4.5 Decomposition of Determinants of Connection Subsidy Performance in Cape Verde -- 5.1 Performance Indicators for Quantity-Based Subsidies -- 5.2 Detailed Decomposition of Factors that Contribute to in the African Subsidy Cases -- 5.3 Effect of Connection Rate and Metering Rate on Potential Beneficiaries of Quantity-Targeted Subsidies -- 5.4 Relationship between Income and Energy Use in 45 Cities in 12 Developing Countries: Average KgOE per Capita per Month -- 5.5 Summary of Evidence on Income Elasticity of Demand for Water and Electricity -- 5.6 Expected Effect of Quantity Targeting on Determinants of Benefit Incidence, under Different Assumptions about the Correlation between Income and Consumption -- 6.1 Effects of Tariff Modifications on the Factors That Determine the Benefit Incidence of Quantity-Targeted Subsidies -- 6.2 Targeting Performance of Simulated Improvements to IBT and VDT Design -- 6.3 Targeting Performance of Subsidy Models That Use Administrative Selection -- 6.4 Percentage of Households That Qualify for Burden Limit Subsidy as Burden Limit Changes -- 7.1 Connection Charges for Water and Sewerage (US) -- 7.2 Performance Indicators for Simulated Targeted Connection Subsidies
7.3 Benefit Targeting Performance of Connection Subsidies under Three Scenarios
"This book is an extremely thorough and readable review of how effective utility subsidies are in reaching the poor. It makes sobering reading for policy makers who have implemented such subsidy programmes, who are looking for ways to ameliorate heavy price increases, or who believed that these subsidies were useful instruments for alleviating poverty." - Catherine Waddams, Director, Center for Competition PolicySchool of Management, University of East Anglia, United Kingdom "This study makes a fine contribution, theoretical and empirical, in an area where much nonsense has been preached, and many misconceptions have long been accepted as gospel. Analyzing a mass of material, the authors quantify the extent to which the most commonly applied forms of utility subsidies are regressive. And they then offer a range of practical measures that can be taken to correct the problem."- John Nellis, Senior Fellow Center for Global Development, Washington, DC While consumer utility subsidies are widespread in both the water and electricity sectors, their effectiveness in reaching and distributing resources to the poor is the subject of much debate. Water, Electricity, and the Poor brings together empirical evidence on subsidy performance across a wide range of countries. It documents the prevalence of consumer subsidies, provides a typology of the many variants found in the developing world, and presents a number of indicators useful in assessing the degree to which such subsidies benefit the poor, focusing on three key concepts: beneficiary incidence, benefit incidence, and materiality. The findings on subsidy performance will be useful to policy makers, utility regulators, and sector practitioners who are contemplating introducing, eliminating, or modifying utility subsidies, and to those who view consumer utility subsidies as a social protection
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Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2020. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries
Link Print version: Komives, Kristin Water, Electricity, and the Poor : Who Benefits from Utility Subsidies? Washington : World Bank Publications,c2005 9780821363423
Subject Public utilities -- Rates -- Developing countries.;Subsidies -- Developing countries
Electronic books
Alt Author Foster, Vivien
Halpern, Jonathan
Wodon, Quentin