LEADER 00000nam 2200325 4500
001 AAI3431157
005 20110506125631.5
008 110506s2010 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 9781124318134
035 (UMI)AAI3431157
040 UMI|cUMI
100 1 Penta, Antonio
245 10 Incomplete information and robustness in strategic
environments
300 214 p
500 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-
12, Section: A, page:
500 Adviser: George J. Mailath
502 Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2010
520 Game theoretic modeling involves making assumptions on
agents' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. These assumptions
are understood to be only approximately satisfied in the
actual situation. Thus, the significance of game theoretic
predictions depend on robustness properties of the
solution concepts adopted. Chapter 1 discusses recent
results in this research area and their relations with the
results obtained in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 2
explores the impact of misspecification of higher order
beliefs in static environments, when arbitrary common
knowledge assumptions on payoffs are relaxed. (Existing
literature focuses on the extreme case in which all such
assumptions are relaxed.) Chapter 3 provides a
characterization of the strongest predictions, for dynamic
games, that are "robust" to possible misspecifications of
agents' higher order beliefs, and shows that such
characterization depends on modeling assumptions that have
hitherto received little attention in the literature
(namely, the distinction between knowledge and certainty ),
raising novel questions of robustness. Chapter 4 develops
a methodology to address classical questions of
implementation, when agents' beliefs are unknown to the
designer and their private information changes over time.
The key idea is the identification of a solution concept
that allows a tractable analysis of the full
implementation problem: Full "robust" implementation
requires that, for all models of agents' beliefs, all the
perfect Bayesian equilibria of a mechanism induce outcomes
consistent with the social choice function (SCF). It is
shown that, for a weaker notion of equilibrium and for a
general class of games, the set of all such equilibria can
be computed by means of a "backwards procedure" that
combines the logic of rationalizability and backward
induction reasoning. It is further shown that a SCF is
(partially) implementable for all models of beliefs if and
only if it is ex-post incentive compatible. In
environments with single crossing preferences, strict ex-
post incentive compatibility and a "contraction property"
are sufficient to guarantee full robust implementation in
direct mechanisms. This property limits the
interdependence in agents' valuations
590 School code: 0175
650 4 Economics, General
650 4 Economics, Theory
690 0501
690 0511
710 2 University of Pennsylvania
773 0 |tDissertation Abstracts International|g71-12A
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