LEADER 00000nam a22004453i 4500 
001    EBC1606936 
003    MiAaPQ 
005    20200713055258.0 
006    m     o  d |       
007    cr cnu|||||||| 
008    200713s2012    xx      o     ||||0 eng d 
020    9781475539240|q(electronic bk.) 
020    |z9781475505542 
035    (MiAaPQ)EBC1606936 
035    (Au-PeEL)EBL1606936 
035    (CaPaEBR)ebr10627044 
035    (OCoLC)805985260 
040    MiAaPQ|beng|erda|epn|cMiAaPQ|dMiAaPQ 
050  4 HC79.F55 -- A56 2012eb 
082 0  337 
100 1  Annen, Kurt 
245 10 Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation 
264  1 Washington DC :|bInternational Monetary Fund,|c2012 
264  4 |c©2012 
300    1 online resource (38 pages) 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
490 1  IMF Working Papers 
505 0  Cover -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Donor 
       Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation -- 3 Background 
       Literature -- 4 Model -- 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid 
       Impact -- 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact -- 
       4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs -- 4.4 Introducing More 
       Recipients and More Donors -- 5 Empirical Evidence -- 6 
       Conclusion -- References -- Figures -- 1 Number of 
       Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares -- 2 
       Global Aid Herfindahl Index -- 3 Best-Response Functions 
       with Identical Donors -- 4 Best-Response Functions with 
       Non-Identical Donors -- 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative 
       Donor Size -- Tables -- 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors
       -- 2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity -- 3 Donor 
       Selectivity and Herfindahl Index -- Appendix A -- Proof of
       Proposition 1 -- Description of Best-Response Functions --
       Proof of Proposition 4 -- Appendix B -- Table 4: Donor 
       Selectivity and MLD -- Table 5: Donor Selectivity and 
       Theil Index 
520    This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid 
       impact spread their budgets across many recipient 
       countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid 
       fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even 
       without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the
       equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical 
       evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply 
       that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid
       impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations 
       are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to 
       increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness 
       risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as 
       any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation 
588    Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other
       sources 
590    Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest 
       Ebook Central, 2020. Available via World Wide Web. Access 
       may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated 
       libraries 
650  0 Economic assistance.;Flow of funds 
655  4 Electronic books 
700 1  Moers, Luc 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aAnnen, Kurt|tDonor Competition for Aid 
       Impact, and Aid Fragmentation|dWashington DC : 
       International Monetary Fund,c2012|z9781475505542 
830  0 IMF Working Papers 
856 40 |uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sinciatw/
       detail.action?docID=1606936|zClick to View