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Author Calemi, Francesco Federico
Title Metaphysics and Scientific Realism : Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong
Imprint Berlin/Boston : De Gruyter, Inc., 2016
©2016
book jacket
Descript 1 online resource (270 pages)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
Series Eide Ser. ; v.9
Eide Ser
Note Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- Mirage Realism Revisited -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The one over many problem -- 3 Devitt's charge of mirage realism -- 4 The one over many problem and Armstrong's world of states of affairs -- 5 Instantiation as partial identity -- 6 The one over many problem and the Platonic view of universals -- Ostrich Nominalism or Ostrich Platonism? -- 1 What is it like to be an ostrich? -- 2 The argument from gross facts -- 3 The harlot argument -- 4 The truthmaker argument -- 5 Sketch for a Platonic theory of predication -- 6 Concluding remarks -- In Defense of Transcendent Universals -- 1 Armstrong's ontological method -- 2 Armstrong's primary critique of transcendent realism -- 3 A reply to the primary critique -- 4 "How can distinct particulars have the same properties?" -- 5 Arguments, not explanations -- Armstrong and Tropes -- 1 Universals and tropes -- 2 Tropes and substances -- 3 Armstrong's objections to trope nominalism -- 4 Answers to the objections -- 5 Some advantages of trope nominalism -- 6 Remaining problems for the trope nominalist -- 7 Conclusion -- Tropes: For and Against -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Tropes and the one over many -- 3 Armstrong on what is the 'best' version of the trope view -- 4 Armstrong on why there are no tropes -- 5 Piling, swapping, and 'Hochberg's argument' -- 6 Laws of nature and resemblance -- Facts: An Essay in Aporetics -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Facts as contingently existing concreta -- 3 The truth-maker argument for facts -- 4 Butchvarov's objections to realism about facts -- 4.1 An argument from imperceivability -- 4.2 An argument from impossibility of reference -- 4.3 The Paradox of the Horse and the Paradox of Snow -- 5 Problems with the concretist conception of facts -- 5.1 The collision of the compositional and necessitarian models -- 5.2 Problems with the compositionalist model
5.3 Necessitarianism and the collapse of Armstrong's fact ontology -- 6 Facts as abstract objects: Reinhardt Grossmann -- 6.1 The localization argument against concrete facts -- 6.2 The 'bare particular' objection to abstract facts -- 7 Concluding aporetic postscript -- Armstrong's Hidden Substantialism -- 1 Introduction: Is Factualism a Truth of Armstrong's Ontology? -- 2 States of a airs and the problem of universals -- 3 States of a airs and the problem of truth -- 4 The categorial clash between factualism and the victory of particularity -- 5 Concluding remarks: the ontological consequences of the clash -- Persisting Particulars and their Properties -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Transdurantism -- 3 Objects as property bundles -- 4 Objects as substrata with properties -- 5 Location relations -- 6 Explanation and identity -- Armstrong on Dispositions and Laws of Nature -- 1 Dispositions, ontologically speaking -- 2 Was Armstrong's account su ciently realist? -- 3 Powers, actualism and degrees of being -- 4 Potency and act -- 5 Laws to the rescue? -- 6 Tendencies -- 7 Conclusion -- Recombination for Combinatorialists -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Constituents of states of a airs -- 3 Recombination for combinatorialists -- 4 Rebutting the trickle-down objection -- 5 Rebutting the objection from alien possibilities -- 6 Conclusions -- Who's Afraid of Non-Existent Manifestations? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The argument -- 3 Armstrong vs. powers -- 4 Getting rid of non-existent manifestations -- 5 Some miscellaneous concerns about Meinongianism -- Armstrong on Truthmaking and Realism -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Truthmaking and realism -- 3 Truthmaking as ontologically neutral -- 4 Realism can stand on its own -- From Translations to Truthmakers -- 1 Translations -- 2 Truth conditions -- 3 Dispositions -- 4 Truthmakers -- 5 Functionalism -- 6 Physicalism
7 Beliefs and desires -- Armstrong's Supervenience and Ontological Dependence -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The basics of Armstrong's ontology -- 3 The no distinctness proposal -- 4 Supervenience and ontological dependence -- 5 Supervenience as neither su cient nor necessary for ontological dependence -- 6 Cases of asymmetric supervenience -- 7 Cases of symmetric supervenience -- 8 Instantiation and Bradley's regress -- Naturalism as a Background Metaphysics -- 1 Understanding Armstrong's naturalistic position -- 2 The under-determination of the thesis -- 3 The negative content -- 4 The positive content -- 5 Is the a priori back? -- Index
The series offers high-quality studies dealing with the fundamental topics of classical, phenomenological, and analytical ontology, such as metaphysics, categories, property theory, causation, natural laws, the phenomenological and scientific realism debate, truth, existence, and many others
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2020. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries
Link Print version: Calemi, Francesco Federico Metaphysics and Scientific Realism : Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong Berlin/Boston : De Gruyter, Inc.,c2016 9783110454611
Subject Metaphysics
Electronic books
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