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Author Kleit, Andrew N
Title Modern Energy Market Manipulation
Imprint Bingley : Emerald Publishing Limited, 2018
©2019
book jacket
Descript 1 online resource (240 pages)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
Note Intro -- Modern Energy Market Manipulation -- Contents -- About the Author -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- References -- Chapter 1: What is Manipulation? What is Not Manipulation? -- I. Introduction -- II. A Commodity Market -- A. Selling to the Commodity Market -- B. Buying from the Exchange -- C. Challenges for the Exchange -- D. Challenges for the Commodity Trader -- III. Defining Manipulation -- IV. Speculation, Arbitrage, and Market Power -- References -- Chapter 2: Economic Theories of Manipulation -- I. Introduction -- II. Two (Relatively) Early Works -- III. Pirrong Creates a Field -- IV. Works by Ledgerwood and Coauthors -- V. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Some Historical Manipulation Cases, or Understanding Why the Hunt Brothers Did Not Manipulate the Silver Market -- I. Introduction -- II. General Foods v. Brannan (1948) -- III. Great Western v. Brannan (1953) -- 4. H. W. Miller and Company v. Benson (1958) -- V. Volkart Brothers (1962) -- 6. Cargill v. Harden (1971) -- VII. The Hunt Brothers Silver Escapade -- VIII. Concluding Thoughts -- References -- Chapter 4: DiPlacido: the CFTC Confuses Manipulation and Hedging -- I. Introduction -- II. The Parties and the Procedure -- B. The Process at an Administrative Agency -- C. Weaknesses of the Procedure -- III. The Contending Theories -- A. Options and How to Hedge with Them -- B. The Manipulation Theory -- C. The Available Evidence -- IV. The CFTC's Path to a Manipulation Finding -- A. Showing an Artificial Price -- B. Violating Bids: The Crux of the CFTC's Decision -- 1. Motives for Violating Bidders -- 2. Were Bidders Violated, and If So, So What? -- C. Misconstruing Henner -- D. Motive Is Not Necessary -- or Misconstruing Cargill -- V. The Bad Words -- VI. Final Thoughts: Deference Does Not Seem to be Appropriate -- References
Chapter 5: Introduction to Electricity Markets -- I. Introduction -- II. Restructured Electricity Markets -- B. Regional Transmission Organizations -- III. The Three-node Model -- B. Supply and Demand -- IV. Other Markets -- A. Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets -- B. Financial Transmission Rights -- C. Ancillary Markets -- V. Some Concluding Thoughts -- References -- Chapter 6: Were California's Electricity Markets Manipulated, and by Whom? -- I. Introduction -- II. Electricity Restructuring in California -- A. Price Caps and Finger Pointing -- III. ENRON -- B. ENRON in the California Crisis -- IV. Congestion-Related Strategies -- A. Load Shifting -- B. Death Star and Cut Schedules -- V. An Ancillary Market Strategy - "Get Shorty" -- VI. Why were Real-Time Prices Higher than Day-Ahead Prices? -- VII. Interpreting Price Arbitrage Strategies -- A. "Ricochet" -- 2. Economic Analysis of Ricochet -- B. Overgeneration and Fat Boy -- VIII. Gaming -- IX. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 7: Deutsche Bank: What should the Legal Rule for Trading Financial Transmission Rights be? -- I. Introduction -- II. The Prosecution's Case -- B. The Proceedings and FERC Staff's Arguments -- III. Deutsche Bank's Arguments -- A. Deutsche Bank's Motivation -- B. Why Did Deutsche Bank Lose Money? -- C. "Degenerate Pricing" and "Artificial" Prices -- D. Other Issues -- IV. The Available Legal Standards -- A. Stand-Alone Profitability: Ex Ante or Ex Post? -- B. Per Se Illegality -- C. The Original Intent Rule -- D. Subsequent FERC Cases -- V. Why Bring this Case? Why Fight this Case? -- VI. Conclusion: What is the Legal Rule for FTRs? -- References -- Chapter 8: Amaranth and Brian Hunter: You Certainly Look Guilty -- I. Introduction -- II. What was Amaranth? -- III. Proceedings -- IV. The Staff's Case and Hunter's Rebuttals -- B. A Side Excursion on Put Options
C. Now Back to Our Story -- V. The Battle of the Economists -- B. Lies, Damn Lies, and Econometrics -- 2. Kaminski's Analysis -- C. Quinn and Fischel for the Defense -- VI. The Commission Decision -- VII. Settlements and Jurisdiction -- VIII. Searching for Manipulation in All the Wrong Places? -- IX. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 9: BP America: Let the Best Story Win! -- I. Introduction -- II. The Parties and the Proceedings -- III. Framing the Open -- IV. Arbitrage and Early Trading -- V. Other Trading Strategies -- VI. Scienter -- VII. Manipulation and the Theory of the Firm -- B. Incentive of an Individual Trader -- C. Firm Compliance -- VIII. Other Issues -- IX. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 10: Barclays: The Defendant Meets Mr. Kafka -- I. Introduction -- II. The Process -- III. The Show Cause Order -- B. Scienter - The Bad Words -- C. The Damages Amount and Other Open Questions -- IV. The Exchange Between Barclays and Staff -- B. The Staff Response - Giving away the bad words Argument -- V. Ferc's Penalty Order - How Can Defendants Defend Themselves? -- VI. Dean Hubbard's Statement -- VII. The District Court's Decision on Discovery -- VIII. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 11: Rumford and Silkman: Money for Nothing, Kicks for Free -- I. Introduction -- II. Demand Response Policy -- III. The Parties and the Process -- IV. The Show Cause Orders -- V. The Defense of Rumford and Silkman -- A. DALRP was a Poor Policy -- B. The Rules of the DALRP were Unclear -- C. Scienter -- VI. The Commission's Penalty Order and Afterwards -- VII. Concluding Thoughts -- References -- Chapter 12: Powhatan: What is Manipulation? -- I. Introduction -- II. Those Transmission Losses -- III. The Participants and the Proceedings -- IV. The Show Cause Order -- B. The Manipulation Analysis -- C. Scienter -- V. Powhatan's Response: The Cavalcade of Stars
A. Taking Advantage of a Loophole is not Illegal, and Arguably was of Assistance to PJM -- B. Powhatan's Trades were not Riskless, and Therefore were not wash Trades -- C. Return to Death Star, Fraud, and "Well Functioning Markets" -- VI. Staff's Rebuttal and the Commission's Initial Decision -- B. The Commission's Penalty Order -- VII. Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 13: Some Final Thoughts -- Name Index -- Subject Index
This book explores the important economic and legal questions of market manipulation that have arisen in restructured energy markets, paying particular attention to the actions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2020. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries
Link Print version: Kleit, Andrew N. Modern Energy Market Manipulation Bingley : Emerald Publishing Limited,c2018 9781787433861
Subject Energy industries-Corrupt practices.
Fraud
Electronic books
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