LEADER 00000nam  2200277   4500 
001    AAIMR34373 
005    20081202145641.5 
008    081202s2007    ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d 
020    9780494343739 
035    (UMI)AAIMR34373 
040    UMI|cUMI 
100 1  Pecoskie, Theresa K 
245 10 Naturalizing moral judgment 
300    69 p 
500    Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 46-03, 
       page: 1260 
502    Thesis (M.A.)--University of Waterloo (Canada), 2007 
520    Philosophers have traditionally attempted to solve 
       metaethical disputes about the nature of moral judgment 
       through reasoned argument alone. Empirical evidence about 
       how we do make moral judgments is often overlooked in 
       these debates. In the wake of recent discoveries in 
       cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology, 
       however, some empirically-minded philosophers are 
       beginning to use neural findings in support of their 
       theories of moral judgment. The intent of this thesis is 
       to explore how this empirical evidence can be integrated 
       effectively into philosophical discussions about moral 
       judgment. In the first chapter of my thesis, I review the 
       moral judgment debate in both philosophy and moral 
       psychology, focusing specifically on contemporary 
       sentimentalist solutions to this problem. This review sets
       the stage for my critique of Prinz's sentimentalist 
       account of moral judgment in the second chapter. I argue 
       that Prinz uses neural evidence to support his 
       sentimentalist thesis inappropriately, altering the 
       evidence to fit his theory, rather than using the evidence
       to inform his theory. In the third chapter, I examine 
       Prinz's somatic theory of emotion and how this is related 
       to his theory of moral judgment. I argue that neural 
       evidence indicates that a theory of emotion that 
       incorporates aspects of both cognitive appraisal and 
       somatic theories is more empirically accurate than either 
       view in isolation. Finally, I discuss the implications 
       that a neural account of emotion could have on future 
       debates about the nature of moral judgment 
590    School code: 1141 
590    DDC 
650  4 Philosophy 
690    0422 
710 2  University of Waterloo (Canada) 
773 0  |tMasters Abstracts International|g46-03 
856 40 |uhttp://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/
       advanced?query=MR34373