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100 1  Quint, Daniel 
245 10 Essays on pricing in strategic settings 
300    113 p 
500    Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-
       06, Section: A, page: 2595 
500    Adviser:  Paul Milgrom 
502    Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2007 
520    I model a number of multi-player strategic environments, 
       and examine the effects of market structure, information, 
       and inference on the prices that are realized in 
       equilibrium. I present a theoretical model of patent pools
       in a setting with a single core technology with many 
       possible implementations, and show that pooling of patents
       which are essential to the technology leads to lower 
       prices and higher welfare, while pooling of patents which 
       are not essential, even when they are complements, can be 
       welfare-positive or welfare-negative. I analyze a class of
       two-bidder common-value auctions, and show that a bidder 
       prefers to appear well-informed when his private 
       information is independent of his opponent's, but prefers 
       to appear poorly-informed when his information is closely 
       related to his opponent's. Finally, I consider the problem
       of statistical inference in private-value ascending 
       auctions; I show that, given whatever historical data has 
       been observed, the seller's expected revenue and the 
       revenue-maximizing reserve price are decreasing in the 
       degree of correlation between bidders' values, and 
       calculate upper and lower bounds on both quantities 
590    School code: 0212 
590    DDC 
650  4 Economics, Theory 
690    0511 
710 2  Stanford University 
773 0  |tDissertation Abstracts International|g68-06A 
856 40 |uhttp://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/