LEADER 00000nam  2200325   4500 
001    AAI3254475 
005    20071217104331.5 
008    071217s2007                        eng d 
035    (UMI)AAI3254475 
040    UMI|cUMI 
100 1  Schiraldi, Pasquale 
245 10 Durable goods and the role of the second-hand market 
300    102 p 
500    Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-
       03, Section: A, page: 1096 
500    Adviser:  Marc Rysman 
502    Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2007 
520    My dissertation analyzes how the second-hand market 
       influences consumer replacement decisions of durable goods
       and enhances strategies that allow firms to increase their
       monopoly power 
520    In chapter 1, I analyze the incentive for a monopolist to 
       influence the secondary market using a buy-back policy. 
       The theoretical model captures the market practice of 
       offering trade-in deals. The monopolist commits to buy 
       used goods from consumers willing to replace them with new
       units. The monopolist aims at increasing the demand for 
       new goods by increasing the resale value 
520    In chapter 2, I develop a theoretical model to show how in
       an oligopolistic setting the second-hand market plays a 
       key role in supporting collusive behavior. The intuition 
       is that the prospect of obtaining a high price in the 
       second-hand market increases the demand for new goods. 
       This means that the expectation of a price war unleashed 
       by the violation of a collusive agreement will decrease 
       not only the future prices of the new and used goods but 
       also the current price of the new goods, thus making the 
       defection itself less profitable 
520    In chapter 3, I specify and estimate a structural dynamic 
       model of consumer preferences for new and used cars. Its 
       primary contribution is to provide an explicit estimation 
       procedure for transaction costs, which are crucial to 
       capture the dynamic nature of consumer decisions. The data
       from 1994 to 2004 come from the Italian Motor Registry. 
       They include information about sales dates for individual 
       cars as well as the initial stock of cars in 1994. 
       Identification of the transaction costs is achieved from 
       the difference in the share of households choosing to hold
       a given car-type each period, and from the share of 
       households choosing to purchase the same car-type that 
       period. Specifically, I estimate a random coefficient 
       discrete choice model that incorporates a dynamic optimal 
       stopping problem as in Rust. The large estimate of the 
       transaction costs explains the high persistence in the 
       stock of automobile held by consumers. Finally, I apply 
       the model to evaluate the impact of scrappage subsidies on
       the Italian automobile market in 1997 and 1998 
590    School code: 0017 
590    DDC 
650  4 Economics, General 
690    0501 
710 20 Boston University 
773 0  |tDissertation Abstracts International|g68-03A 
856 40 |uhttp://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/