| Descript |
xiii, 163 pages ; 24 cm |
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text txt rdacontent |
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unmediated n rdamedia |
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volume nc rdacarrier |
| Note |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 142-155) and index |
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Introduction: Sympathetic resentment -- Vicious passions : resentment and sociability before Butler -- Innocent resentment, sympathy, and liberal duty in Butler -- Sympathizing with injustice : Hume on resentment -- Coping with resentment : spectatorial resentment and spontaneous disorder in Smith -- Conclusion: Resentment reconsidered |
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"We typically think of resentment as an unjustifiable and volatile emotion, responsible for fostering the worst political divisions. Recognizing Resentment argues instead that sympathy with the resentment of victims of injustice is vital for upholding justice in liberal societies, because it entails recognition of the equal moral and political status of those with whom we sympathize. Sympathizing with the resentment of others makes us alive to injustice in a way no rational recognition of wrongs can, and it motivates us to demand justice on others' behalves. This book rehabilitates arguments for the moral and political worth of resentment developed by three important thinkers in the early liberal tradition - Joseph Butler, David Hume, and Adam Smith - and uses them to advance a theory of spectatorial resentment that explains why we should be indignant about the injustice others face and how such a shared sentiment can actually bring liberal citizens closer together"-- Provided by publisher |
| Subject |
Justice -- Psychological aspects
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Resentment
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