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Author Steiner, Jakub
Title Essays on coordination problems
book jacket
Descript 86 p
Note Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-03, Section: A, page: 1047
Adviser: Avner Shaked
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Univerzita Karlova (Czech Republic), 2006
Coordination cycles. We build a dynamic global game in which players repeatedly face a similar coordination problem. By choosing a risky action (invest) instead of an outside option (not invest), players risk instantaneous losses as well as payoffs from future stages, in which they cannot participate if they go bankrupt. Thus, the total strategic risk associated with investment in a particular stage depends on the expected continuation payoff. High expected future payoffs make investment today more risky and therefore harder to coordinate on, which decreases today's payoff. Expectation of successful coordination tomorrow undermines successful coordination today which leads to fluctuations of equilibrium behavior even if the underlying economic fundamentals happen to be stationary. The dynamic game inherits the equilibrium uniqueness of static global games
Coordination in a mobile world. We study coordination failures in many simultaneously occurring coordination problems called projects. Players encounter one of these projects, but have an outside option to search for another of the projects. Drawing on the global games approach, we show that such a \emph{mobile} game has a unique equilibrium which allows us to examine comparative statics. The endogeneity of the outside option value and of the search activity leads to non-monotonicity of welfare with respect to search costs; high mobility may hurt players. Moreover, outcomes of the mobile game are remarkably robust to changes in the exogenous parameters. In contrast to the "static" benchmark global game without a search option, successful coordination is frequent in the mobile game even for extremely poor distributions of economic fundamentals, and coordination failures are common even for extremely good distributions. The strategic consequences of the search option are robust to various modifications of the model
Strong enforcement by a weak authority. This paper studies enforcement abilities of authorities with limited commitment to punish violators. Commitment of resources sufficing to punish only one agent is needed to enforce high compliance of arbitrary many agents. Though existence of other, non-compliance equilibria is generally inevitable, there exist punishment rules suitable for limited authority assuring that compliance prevails in the long run under a stochastic evolution
School code: 1486
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 67-03A
Subject Economics, Theory
Alt Author Univerzita Karlova (Czech Republic)
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