| Descript |
112 p |
| Note |
Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 46-03, page: 1261 |
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Thesis (M.A.)--University of Calgary (Canada), 2007 |
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The nature of scientific laws is one of several prominent issues in philosophy of science. The purpose of this thesis is to highlight a particular view of laws, called Necessitarianism, and illustrate how it heavily relies on a particular class of statements for motivation. More specifically, it crucially relies on true yet accidental universal generalizations. It will then be argued that such generalizations, on the basis of the Necessitarian view of induction, are not available for employment in the Necessitarian arguments. It is concluded that the Necessitarian position faces a serious dilemma, and as a result is ultimately less compelling. The main alternative account of laws, the Regularity theory, is then discussed, but is also found to have difficulties with respect to the problem of induction |
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School code: 0026 |
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DDC |
| Host Item |
Masters Abstracts International 46-03
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| Subject |
Philosophy
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0422
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| Alt Author |
University of Calgary (Canada)
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