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040    UMI|cUMI 
100 1  Wiesmann, Jurgen 
245 10 Regulating China's state enterprises:  Environmental 
       policy as a bargaining game 
300    115 p 
500    Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-
       09, Section: A, page: 3452 
500    Adviser:  Peter Schran 
502    Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
520    This study proposes a new conceptual framework for 
       analyzing the environmental regulation of state 
       enterprises in China. It characterizes the regulatory 
       relationship as a complex bargaining process between 
       powerful local governments and relatively autonomous state
       -owned enterprises. The bargaining involves economic as 
       well as environmental variables and leads to case-by-case 
       solutions rather than the uniform application of anonymous
       laws. Based on this framework, the study derives a number 
       of hypotheses about the forces that drive the 
       environmental performance of state enterprises and 
       subsequently tests them with econometrical methods. More 
       specifically, the study finds that old and loss-making 
       enterprises receive easier regulatory treatment. In 
       addition, regulators whose budget is tightly constrained 
       tend to apply relatively lax environmental regulations and
       may exempt many enterprises from regulation altogether 
520    The study recognizes the obvious shortcomings in China's 
       environmental performance. However, it argues that it is 
       insufficient to focus exclusively on either enforcement 
       problems or the design flaws of individual policies. By 
       contrast, the study identifies some of the macroeconomic 
       and institutional factors that constrain the ability of 
       policy makers to effectively address China's environmental
       problems. In particular, the study points to the extreme 
       decentralization of the Chinese bureaucracy which has 
       local authorities deal with environmental problems that 
       extend far beyond their own territory. Moreover, the 
       regulation of loss-making state enterprises poses numerous
       problems. Many local authorities are operating on a tight 
       budget and are unable to sufficiently subsidize such 
       enterprises to ensure their compliance with environmental 
       targets. The fact that loss-making enterprises have 
       private information about their abatement costs aggravates
       the situation, since it gives the enterprises an 
       opportunity to capture information rents from the 
       regulator. Finally, the application of clean technologies 
       in loss-making enterprises proves difficult because of the
       great informational asymmetries involved 
590    School code: 0090 
650  4 Economics, General 
650  4 Political Science, Public Administration 
690    0501 
690    0617 
710 2  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
773 0  |tDissertation Abstracts International|g60-09A 
856 40 |uhttp://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/