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Author Double, Richard, author
Title The non-reality of free will / Richard Double
Imprint New York : Oxford University Press, 1991
book jacket
 Euro-Am Studies Lib  123.5 D743 1991    AVAILABLE    30500100595605
 RCHSS Library  BJ1461 D67    AVAILABLE    30560400049075
Descript xi, 247 pages ; 22 cm
text txt rdacontent
unmediated n rdamedia
volume nc rdacarrier
Note Includes bibliographical references (pages 235-241) and index
The Problem of the Reality of Free Will -- Definitions of Terms -- Hierarchical Compatibilism Defended -- A Compatibilist Account of Free Will -- Two Hierarchical Accounts -- Problems for the Accounts of Frankfurt and Watson -- The First Line of Reply: Let's Distinguish between Intrusive and Non-Intrusive Controllers -- The Second Line of Reply: The Autonomy Variable Strategy -- Five Autonomy Variables -- The Autonomy Variable Account -- How the Autonomy Account Handles the Local and Global Challenges -- The Third Line of Reply: "Free Will" as an Internalistic Concept -- Does Freedom Require Morality? -- Three Arguments for the Affirmative Answer -- The Case for the Negative Answer -- Replies to the Three Arguments -- Compatibilism and Moral Responsibility -- The Content and Ascribability Issues -- Reduced Content and Consequentialist Ascribability -- Problems with Consequentialist Ascribability -- Formalist Moral Responsibility -- Free Will Unravelled -- Free Will as an Exemplar Concept -- The Normative Problem -- Four Cases to Illustrate the Normative Problem -- The Bribe Problem -- Do Causes That Incline without Compelling Reduce Free Will? -- Does Being Free Entail Feeling Free? -- Three Exemplars of Freedom -- Some Empirical Support for the Free Will Exemplars -- The Three Exemplars and the Unsettled Free Will Questions -- Meta-Compatibilism -- The Argument for Meta-Compatibilism -- Objections and Replies -- An Argument for Moral Non-Realism -- Three Theories of Moral Properties -- The Argument against Objective Moral Realism
Subject Free will and determinism
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