LEADER 00000nam  2200361   4500 
001    AAI3446817 
005    20111103085929.5 
008    111103s2010    ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d 
020    9781124505435 
035    (UMI)AAI3446817 
040    UMI|cUMI 
100 1  Preece, Jessica Robinson 
245 14 The Party and the "Personal" Vote: The Impact of Party 
       Control of Ballot Access and Means of Cultivating a 
       Personal Reputation in Mixed-Member Electoral System 
       Countries 
300    112 p 
500    Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-
       04, Section: A, page: 1429 
500    Adviser: Kathleen Bawn 
502    Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 
       2010 
520    In countries where electoral rules encourage candidates to
       develop a "personal vote," parties are generally assumed 
       to be fairly weak. However, parties often have non-obvious
       ways of influencing the political process, even in 
       ostensibly candidate-centered systems. These include 
       formal or informal control over "ballot access"---
       candidate selection, nominations, and party list rankings-
       --as well as the ability to co-opt the means of 
       cultivating a personal vote through controlling reputation
       -building resources like name recognition, campaign funds,
       pork and patronage, and voting record. This dissertation 
       highlights these ways in which parties are able to 
       undermine the autonomy politicians are assumed to have in 
       political systems that encourage a personal vote 
520    It begins by clarifying the contradictory literature on 
       legislative voting behavior in mixed-member electoral 
       system countries by showing that type of electoral mandate
       alone does not consistently predict which class of 
       politicians will defect from the party line more 
       frequently; however, when type of electoral mandate is 
       considered in concert with whether parties or voters 
       control ballot access, consistent patterns emerge. Namely,
       when parties control nominations, politicians tend to vote
       with the party, even when they are elected under 
       majoritarian electoral rules 
520    The dissertation continues with a close examination of 
       2004 and 2008 election returns in one mixed-member 
       electoral system country, Lithuania. It finds that even 
       when controlling for a variety of factors such as a 
       politician's voting record, incumbency status, geographic 
       constituency, campaign finance, and performance in 
       previous elections, voters appear to be highly influenced 
       by parties' pre-election ranking of candidates when they 
       allocate their preference votes in the open-list PR 
       component of the election. This suggests that even under 
       electoral laws that promote candidate-centeredness, 
       parties have the ability to exert significant influence 
       over the "personal" vote by controlling resources that 
       politicians need to develop their personal reputation 
520    All of these findings reinforce the point that researchers
       must consider the full range of both formal and informal 
       electoral incentives that politicians face. The oft-
       overlooked factor of who controls access to the ballot 
       deserves to be included alongside other electoral 
       incentives. Further, who controls the means of cultivating
       a personal vote also deserves to be seriously considered. 
       Both of these variables have the ability to significantly 
       alter the chain of accountability between parties and 
       politicians 
590    School code: 0031 
650  4 Baltic Studies 
650  4 Political Science, General 
690    0361 
690    0615 
710 2  University of California, Los Angeles 
773 0  |tDissertation Abstracts International|g72-04A 
856 40 |uhttp://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/
       advanced?query=3446817