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Author Ben-Shahar, Omri
Title Fault in American Contract Law
Imprint New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010
book jacket
Descript 1 online resource (338 pages)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
Note Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- CONTENTS -- CONTRIBUTORS -- PREFACE -- Introduction -- I. A Positive Account -- II. Normative and Historical Accounts -- III. Explaining Legal Doctrine -- A. Willful Breach -- B. Comparative Fault -- IV. The Morality of Breach -- Conclusion -- ACKNOWLEDGMENT -- PART I: THE CASE FOR STRICT LIABILITY -- TWO: In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract -- Introduction -- I. The Strict Liability Core of Contract Law -- A. The Promisor's Behavior: The Willful Breach Doctrine -- B. The Promisee's Behavior: The Mitigation Principle -- C. Summary -- II. The Normative Case for Strict Liability -- A. Contract Design and the Choice Between Rules and Standards -- B. Rules v. Standards and the Choice Between Formal and Informal Enforcement -- C. The Evidence -- Conclusion -- THREE The Fault Principle as the Chameleon of Contract Law: A Market Function Approach -- Introduction -- I. Nuance as the Common Denominator in a Comparative Law Perspective -- A. The Most Important Nuances in Civil Law Systems -- B. Some Striking Nuances in Common Law Systems -- C. Particular Refi nement in European Investment Services Law -- II. A Market Function Approach -- A. Ethics or Economics - The Wrong Question -- B. Party and Market Expectation as Guidelines -- C. Promise of Results or Promise of Best Efforts - The Core Criteria -- D. Fault, Foreseeability, and Other "Softeners" of Strict Liability -- Conclusion -- ONE: Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker -- I. -- II. -- PART II: THE CASE FOR FAULT -- FOUR: How Fault Shapes Contract Law -- I. Fault and Uncertain Contractual Intent -- II. An Expanded Law and Economics Approach to Fault -- III. A Fault-Based Approach to Contract Damages -- Conclusion -- FIVE: Fault in Contract Law -- Introduction -- I. Theory -- A. A Model -- B. Fault
C. A Comparison: Strict Liability Versus Negligence -- II. Doctrine -- A. Impossibility/Impracticability -- B. Reasonable or Substantial Performance -- C. Good Faith and Best Efforts -- D. Interpretation/Implied Terms -- E. Conditions -- F. Damages -- SIX: The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance -- Introduction -- I. Unconscionability -- A. Markets -- B. Moral Fault -- II. Unexpected Circumstances -- III. Interpretation -- IV. Mistake -- A. The Paradigm Case: The Nonmistaken Party Is Aware of the Mistaken Party's Mechanical Error -- B. The Nonmistaken Party Had Reason to Know of the Mistaken Party's Mechanical Error -- C. Cases in Which the Nonmistaken Party Neither Knew nor Had Reason to Know of the Mechanical Error -- V. Nonperformance -- Conclusion -- PART III: BETWEEN STRICT LIABILITY AND FAULT -- SEVEN: Fault at the Contract-Tort Interface -- Introduction -- I. Modernizing Tort and Contract Around Fault -- II. Explaining the Fault Swap -- III. Products Liability and Fault at the Border Between Contract and Tort -- Conclusion -- EIGHT: The Many Faces of Fault in Contract Law: Or How to Do Economics Right, Without Really Trying -- Introduction: From Fault to Negligence - and Back -- I. Tort Law -- II. Moving the Tort-Contract Boundary: In Praise of Heterogeneity -- III. Gratuitous Transactions: Bailment and Agency -- A. Coggs v. Bernard -- B. Thorne v. Deas -- C. Siegel v. Spear and Comfort v. McGorkle -- D. Medical Malpractice, Occupier's Liability, and Guest Statutes -- IV. Frustration and Impossibility -- Conclusion -- NINE: The Productive Tension Between Official and Unofficial Stories of Fault in Contract Law -- I. Official and Unofficial Stories Appear Th roughout Contract Doctrine -- II. Official and Unofficial Stories Make Theoretical Sense
III. Civil Obligation's Brain Is Contract and Its Heart Could Be Tort -- Conclusion -- PART IV: WILLFUL BREACH -- TEN: When Is a Willful Breach "Willful"? The Link Between Definitions and Damages -- I. Defining a "Willful" Breach -- A. Analogies in Criminal Law -- B. Lay Assessments of Culpability -- C. Two Ways of Defining "Willful" -- II. The Analogy to Negligence -- A. Defining a Negligence Regime -- B. "Willful" as a Test for Inefficiency? -- C. The Demands that Negligence Makes of Courts -- III. The Analogy to Strict Liability -- A. The Cost of Excessive Awards Under Strict Liability -- B. Optimal Damages Under Strict Liability -- Conclusion -- ELEVEN: Willful Breach: An Efficient Screen for Efficient Breach -- I. Applying an Expectation Cap to the Contract-Market Differential -- II. Cost of Correction Versus Diminution in Value -- A. Three Variants on Jacob & Youngs -- B. Treatment by the Courts -- Conclusion -- TWELVE: An Information Theory of Willful Breach -- Introduction -- A. The Puzzle -- B. The Traditional Explanation -- C. An Information-Based Explanation -- I. An Information Theory of Willful Breach -- A. The Model -- B. Informal Lessons from the Example -- C. The Efficiency of Supracompensatory Damages -- D. From Moral Hazard to Adverse Selection -- II. Willful Breach Doctrine -- A. Overcompensatory Expectation Damages -- B. Tort Damages for Bad-Faith Breach -- C. Restitution -- Conclusion -- THIRTEEN: Contract Law and the Willfulness Diversion -- Introduction -- I. Expectation Damages and Willful Breach -- II. Willfulness, Material Breach, and Damages -- Conclusion -- PART V: COMPARATIVE FAULT -- FOURTEEN: A Comparative Fault Defense in Contract Law -- Introduction -- I. The Nature and Scope of the Comparative Fault Defense -- A. Noncooperation -- B. Overreliance -- II. The Argument for Adopting the Comparative Fault Defense
A. Setting the Stage -- B. Noncooperation -- C. Overreliance -- 1. When Should Avoiding Overreliance be the Default Rule? -- Conclusion -- FIFTEEN: Stipulated Damages, Superstrict Liability, and Mitigation in Contract Law -- Introduction -- I. Stipulation, Fault, and Mitigation -- A. The Effect of Stipulated Damages on the Nonbreaching Party -- B. The Effect of Stipulated Damages on the Breaching Party -- II. Encouraging Stipulation -- A. How Courts Encourage Parties to Stipulate -- B. Two Advantages of Stipulation: Knowledge and Mitigation -- C. Stipulation Th rough the Lens of Mitigation -- Conclusion -- SIXTEEN: Creditor's Fault: In Search of a Comparative Frame -- Introduction -- I. Comparative Negligence and Mitigation in Contract Law Compared -- II. Comparative Negligence -- III. Mitigation -- IV. Reasonable Reliance -- V. Causation -- VI. Foreseeability -- VII. Explaining the Differences Between Anglo-American and Continental Europe Approaches -- Conclusion -- PART VI: THE MORALITY OF BREACH -- SEVENTEEN: Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts -- I. Summary of the Argument that Breach May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts -- A. Definition of Moral Behavior in a Contingency -- B. The Observed Incompleteness of Contracts -- C. The Morality of Breach When Contracts Are Incomplete -- D. The Nature of Obligations to Perform in Hypothetical Completely Detailed Contracts -- E. The Immorality or Morality of Breach When Contracts Are Incomplete Can Be Inferred from the Willingness of the Party in Breach to Pay Damages -- F. When Is Breach Immoral and When Is It Moral in Practice? -- II. Criticism and Discussion of the Foregoing Argument -- A. The Nature of the Hypothetical Complete Contract -- B. Does the Hypothetical Complete Contract Provide an Appealing Moral Standard?
C. The Idea that Performance Per Se Has Moral Importance -- D. The Choice Among Definitions of Moral Behavior in the Contractual Context -- Conclusion -- EIGHTEEN: Fault and Harm in Breach of Contract -- Introduction -- I. Promise De-moralized, Contract Moralized -- II. Contract and Promise: More on the Relationship -- III. The Harm Principle and Contract Law -- IV. Harm, Fault, and Remedies for Breach -- V. Fault and Institutional Harm -- Conclusion: Toward a Moral Law of Contract -- NINETEEN: Fault in Contracts: A Psychological Approach -- I. Breach as Moral Harm -- II. Breach and the Reference Profi t -- III. Moral Norms as Default Rules -- Conclusion -- CASE INDEX -- SUBJECT INDEX
Representing an unprecedented effort from top scholars, this volume collects original contributions to examine the fundamental role of 'fault' in contract law
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2020. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries
Link Print version: Ben-Shahar, Omri Fault in American Contract Law New York : Cambridge University Press,c2010 9780521769853
Subject Breach of contract -- United States.;Contracts -- United States
Electronic books
Alt Author Porat, Ariel
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