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020    |z9781844651962 
035    (MiAaPQ)EBC1886886 
035    (Au-PeEL)EBL1886886 
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050  4 P107 W455 2014 
082 0  401 
100 1  Weiss, Bernhard 
245 10 How to Understand Language :|bA Philosophical Inquiry 
264  1 London :|bTaylor & Francis Group,|c2009 
264  4 |c©2010 
300    1 online resource (286 pages) 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
505 0  Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- 
       Table of Contents -- Preface -- 1. The puzzles of language
       -- 1.1 The uses of language -- 1.2 Words and meanings -- 
       1.3 Compositionality -- 1.4 The normativity of meaning -- 
       2. The starting-point for analysis -- 2.1 Knowledge -- 2.2
       Linguistic meaning -- 2.3 Frege's distinction between 
       sense and reference -- 2.4 Russell's theory of 
       descriptions -- 2.5 Kripke's attack on descriptivism about
       names -- 2.6 Analysis and singular terms -- 3. Analysing 
       sentence-meaning -- 3.1 Specifying sentence-meaning -- 3.2
       Natural and non-natural meaning -- 3.3 Speaker-meaning -- 
       3.4 Sentence-meaning -- 3.5 Problems for Grice's account -
       - 4. Analysing synonymy -- 4.1 The analytic-synthetic 
       distinction -- 4.2 Holism -- 5. Radical translation -- 5.1
       The indeterminacy of translation (the argument from below)
       -- 5.2 Methodological considerations -- 5.3 The 
       indeterminacy of translation -- 5.4 Quine's conclusions on
       meaning -- 5.5 Evans's response -- 6. The structure of a 
       theory of meaning -- 6.1 What is a theory of meaning? -- 
       6.2 Systematicity -- 6.3 The distinction between sense and
       force -- 6.4 The centrality of assertion -- 6.5 Use-
       conditions versus truth-conditions -- 6.6 Use-conditional 
       theories of understanding -- 7. Radical interpretation -- 
       7.1 Constraints on an adequate theory of truth -- 7.2 The 
       Principle of Charity -- 7.3 An application: saying that --
       7.4 Compositionality and extensionality -- 7.5 Davidson 
       and Foster -- 7.6 Dummett on Davidson -- 8. Linguistic 
       norms, communication and radical interpretation -- 8.1 
       Davidson on communication -- 8.2 A non-normative 
       conception of meaning? -- 8.3 Norms and mistakes -- 8.4 A 
       generalization of the argument? -- 9. Linguistic 
       normativity -- 9.1 Norms and prescriptions -- 9.2 
       Correctness-conditions, practical reasoning and norms -- 
       9.3 Non-literal uses of language 
505 8  9.4 Are the norms substantial? -- 10. Radical or robust? -
       - 10.1 The mysteriousness of language -- 10.2 Doing away 
       with radical interpretation -- 10.3 Indeterminacy of 
       reference -- 10.4 Arguments for robust publicity -- 10.5 
       Rejecting indeterminacy of reference -- 11. Language and 
       community -- 11.1 Natural language is essentially communal
       : semantic externalism -- 11.2 Communication requires 
       publicity of meaning -- 12. Rules and privacy: the problem
       -- 12.1 The problem of rule-following -- 12.2 Kripke's 
       sceptical solution -- 12.3 Problems for the sceptical 
       solution -- 13. Rules and privacy: the solution? -- 13.1 
       Can there be a private language? -- 13.2 Platonism about 
       rules -- 13.3 Consensualism -- 13.4 Finding a way forward 
       -- 13.5 Back to the theory of meaning -- 13.6 Privacy and 
       first-personal authority -- 14. Truth-conditions versus 
       use-conditions -- 14.1 Dummett's attack on truth-
       conditional theories -- 14.2 Brandom on inferentialism 
       versus representationalism -- 14.3 Use-conditional 
       accounts of meaning -- 14.4 The problematic pairs -- 14.5 
       The analytic-synthetic distinction -- Notes -- 
       Bibliography -- Index 
520    Why are philosophers, as opposed to, say, linguists and 
       psychologists, puzzled by language? How should we attempt 
       to shed philosophical light on the phenomenon of language?
       "How to Understand Language" frames its discussion by 
       these two questions. The book begins by thinking about the
       reasons that language is hard to understand from a 
       philosophical point of view and, armed with the fruits of 
       that discussion, begins searching for an approach to these
       questions. After finding fault with approaches based on 
       philosophical analysis and on translation it undertakes an
       extended investigation of the programme of constructing a 
       theory of meaning. Donald Davidson's advocacy of that 
       approach becomes pivotal; though, the book endorses his 
       broad approach, it argues strongly against the roles both 
       of truth theory and of radical interpretation 
588    Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other
       sources 
590    Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest 
       Ebook Central, 2020. Available via World Wide Web. Access 
       may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated 
       libraries 
650  0 Language and languages -- Philosophy.;Philology 
655  4 Electronic books 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aWeiss, Bernhard|tHow to Understand 
       Language : A Philosophical Inquiry|dLondon : Taylor & 
       Francis Group,c2009|z9781844651962 
856 40 |uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sinciatw/
       detail.action?docID=1886886|zClick to View