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Author Oppenheimer, Joe
Title Principles of Politics : A Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice
Imprint New York : Cambridge University Press, 2012
©2012
book jacket
Descript 1 online resource (312 pages)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
Note Cover -- Principles of Politics: A Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice -- Title -- Copyright -- Abstract -- Contents -- Propositions and Corollaries -- Tables -- Figures -- Sidebars -- Definitions -- Preface -- Overview of the Book -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Politics, Universals, Knowledge Claims, and Methods -- KNOWLEDGE -- The Status of the Premises: Truth -- The Relationship of the Premises to the Knowledge Claim: Logical Inference -- Improving Knowledge Claims -- UNIVERSALS, SYNERGY, AND CONTEXT -- RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: PREMISES TO UNDERSTAND POLITICS -- Self-interest -- Preferences -- Research Frontiers: Experiments, Doubts, and Ways Forward -- Choice -- FOR FURTHER READING -- Logic, Knowledge and Truth -- Philosophy of Science -- Rational Choice Theory and The Nature of Politics -- PART I: THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION -- CHAPTER 1: Voluntary Contributions and Collective Action -- PUBLIC GOODS -- GAME THEORY -- SHARED INTERESTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR -- Prisoner Dilemma Games and Collective Action -- Corollaries and Further Implications -- Changing the productivity of a contribution -- POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS -- Transforming the Game -- Rewards and Punishments -- Moral Incentives -- Repetition of the Game -- Repetition and knowledge of the termination point -- RESEARCH FRONTIERS: EXPERIMENTS, DOUBTS, AND WAYS FORWARD -- Behavioral Evidence from Prisoner Dilemma Experiments -- A Further Comment Regarding Communication -- CHAPTER 2: Going Beyond the Prisoner Dilemma -- COLLECTIVE ACTION BEYOND THE PRISONER DILEMMA -- No Dominant Strategy -- The Assurance Game -- The Chicken Game -- The General Case -- CHAPTER 3: Collective Action Applications to and Beyond Democratic Politics -- RATIONAL IGNORANCE -- DOING THE RIGHT THING -- BEHAVIORAL CASCADES AND POPULAR UPRISINGS
COMMON-POOL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION -- BROAD VERSUS NARROW, INTENSE INTERESTS -- VOTING AND THE PARADOX OF VOTING -- The Instrumental Incentive to Vote -- Research Frontiers: Experiments and Ways Forward - Voting as Expressive or Symbolic Behavior -- CONCLUSIONS -- FOR FURTHER READING -- Prisoner Dilemma Games -- Logic of Collective Action -- Theory -- Applications -- PART II: COLLECTIVE CHOICE -- CHAPTER 4: Individual to Collective Choice in One-Dimensional Politics -- SIMPLE SINGLE-DIMENSIONAL ISSUES, SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS, AND MAJORITY RULE -- Performance -- Applications -- Two Party Competition in a One-dimensional Political Space -- Two-Party Competition in a Multidimensional World -- Legislative Committees and the Protection of the Status Quo -- Bicameralism -- Committees and the Power of the Chair -- Filibusters, Structure-Induced Equilibria, and Pivotal Voting -- Concluding Remarks -- CHAPTER 5: Individual to Collective Choice More Generally -- EXTENDING SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES TO TWO DIMENSIONS -- MULTIDIMENSIONAL PREFERENCES WITH MORE THAN TWO PERSONS AND SOCIAL DECISIONS -- The Pareto Set -- Majority Rule -- Getting Beyond Simple Majority Rule -- RESEARCH FRONTIERS: WAYS FORWARD -- Reexamining and Reformulating Distance -- Goods and Bads -- Aggregate Actors and the Presumption of Rational Choice -- THE UNCOVERED SET: STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY WITH CYCLES -- CONCLUSIONS -- FOR FURTHER READING -- Spatial Models in One Dimension -- Spatial Models in More than One Dimension -- The Democratic Advantage -- PART III: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND QUALITY OUTCOMES -- CHAPTER 6: Political Necessity and the Tethering of Leaders -- THE NECESSITY OF GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS -- POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION -- TETHERING POLITICAL LEADERS -- The Constituent-Beneficiary-Agent Problem -- Credible Commitment
REGIME CHANGE -- IN CONCLUSION -- CHAPTER 7: A Few Institutional Pitfalls -- DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS TO GET RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: CHECKS AND BALANCES -- Checks and Balances and Veto Players -- Specialization and Division of Labor and Veto Players -- The Liberal Paradox -- Division of Labor in Policy Formation -- LOCALISM AND ITS LIMITS -- Pork Barrel Politics -- Too Much Democracy, Too Much Freedom? -- RESPONSIVE TO WHOM? -- Turnout and Social Justice -- Money in Electoral Competitions -- Problematic Policy Arenas -- FOR FURTHER READING -- On the Tethering of Political Leaders -- On the Principal-Agent Relation -- On Institutional Design -- On Regime Change -- PART IV: SOCIAL JUSTICE, CHOICE, AND WELFARE -- CHAPTER 8: The General Problem of Collective Welfare and Choice -- SETTING UP THE PROBLEM -- Social Welfare and Democracy: Politically Empowering a Notion of the Good -- Arrow's Argument -- Conflicting Requirements -- Proof of Arrow's Theorem -- A Decisive Group over a Pair of Outcomes Is Decisive over All Pairs of Outcomes -- The Smallest Decisive Group Can Contain No More than a Single Individual -- Discussion of Arrow and Impossibility -- The Result and the Notion of Group Interest -- The Result and Normative Properties of Collective Choice -- CHAPTER 9: Voting Rules -- DEFINING THE ACHIEVABLE -- Majority Rule When There Are but Two Alternatives -- More than Two Alternatives -- Another Property We Might Hope For: Condorcet Ef.ciency -- More Relaxed Systems -- Voting by Veto -- Approval Voting -- THE ROLE OF DISCUSSION AND DELIBERATION -- IN CONCLUSION -- CHAPTER 10: Social Welfare and Social Justice: A Partial Integration -- TO AGGREGATE OR NOT TO AGGREGATE: A FALSE DILEMMA -- WHO IS TO SPECIFY WHAT TO AGGREGATE? -- LOOKING TO SOCIAL JUSTICE TO FIND SOCIAL WELFARE -- A WELFARE FLOOR TO GUARANTEE BASIC NEEDS
Toward a Theory of Social Justice -- Empirical Support -- Back to Politics -- MEETING NEEDS: A MEASURE OF DEMOCRATIC SUCCESS -- A PRELIMINARY INVENTORY OF NEEDS -- PRELIMINARY COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES -- HOW TO EXPLAIN THE OBSERVED DIFFERENCES? -- CONCLUSIONS -- FOR FURTHER READING -- Social Welfare and Social Justice -- Voting Rules -- Conclusions: Questions and Lessons -- The Challenges -- Complex Human Behavior -- Complex Political Systems -- Impartial Reasoning in the Real World -- BETTER OUTCOMES, BETTER INSTITUTIONS -- Political Goals -- Non-Violent Succession -- Beyond Physical Security -- Bibliography -- Name Index -- Subject Index
Presents the rational choice theories of collective action and social choice, applying them to problems of public policy and social justice
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2020. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries
Link Print version: Oppenheimer, Joe Principles of Politics : A Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice New York : Cambridge University Press,c2012 9781107014886
Subject Political science.;Rational choice theory.;Social justice
Electronic books
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