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1 online resource (312 pages) |
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text txt rdacontent |
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computer c rdamedia |
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online resource cr rdacarrier |
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Cover -- Principles of Politics: A Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice -- Title -- Copyright -- Abstract -- Contents -- Propositions and Corollaries -- Tables -- Figures -- Sidebars -- Definitions -- Preface -- Overview of the Book -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Politics, Universals, Knowledge Claims, and Methods -- KNOWLEDGE -- The Status of the Premises: Truth -- The Relationship of the Premises to the Knowledge Claim: Logical Inference -- Improving Knowledge Claims -- UNIVERSALS, SYNERGY, AND CONTEXT -- RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: PREMISES TO UNDERSTAND POLITICS -- Self-interest -- Preferences -- Research Frontiers: Experiments, Doubts, and Ways Forward -- Choice -- FOR FURTHER READING -- Logic, Knowledge and Truth -- Philosophy of Science -- Rational Choice Theory and The Nature of Politics -- PART I: THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION -- CHAPTER 1: Voluntary Contributions and Collective Action -- PUBLIC GOODS -- GAME THEORY -- SHARED INTERESTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR -- Prisoner Dilemma Games and Collective Action -- Corollaries and Further Implications -- Changing the productivity of a contribution -- POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS -- Transforming the Game -- Rewards and Punishments -- Moral Incentives -- Repetition of the Game -- Repetition and knowledge of the termination point -- RESEARCH FRONTIERS: EXPERIMENTS, DOUBTS, AND WAYS FORWARD -- Behavioral Evidence from Prisoner Dilemma Experiments -- A Further Comment Regarding Communication -- CHAPTER 2: Going Beyond the Prisoner Dilemma -- COLLECTIVE ACTION BEYOND THE PRISONER DILEMMA -- No Dominant Strategy -- The Assurance Game -- The Chicken Game -- The General Case -- CHAPTER 3: Collective Action Applications to and Beyond Democratic Politics -- RATIONAL IGNORANCE -- DOING THE RIGHT THING -- BEHAVIORAL CASCADES AND POPULAR UPRISINGS |
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COMMON-POOL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION -- BROAD VERSUS NARROW, INTENSE INTERESTS -- VOTING AND THE PARADOX OF VOTING -- The Instrumental Incentive to Vote -- Research Frontiers: Experiments and Ways Forward - Voting as Expressive or Symbolic Behavior -- CONCLUSIONS -- FOR FURTHER READING -- Prisoner Dilemma Games -- Logic of Collective Action -- Theory -- Applications -- PART II: COLLECTIVE CHOICE -- CHAPTER 4: Individual to Collective Choice in One-Dimensional Politics -- SIMPLE SINGLE-DIMENSIONAL ISSUES, SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS, AND MAJORITY RULE -- Performance -- Applications -- Two Party Competition in a One-dimensional Political Space -- Two-Party Competition in a Multidimensional World -- Legislative Committees and the Protection of the Status Quo -- Bicameralism -- Committees and the Power of the Chair -- Filibusters, Structure-Induced Equilibria, and Pivotal Voting -- Concluding Remarks -- CHAPTER 5: Individual to Collective Choice More Generally -- EXTENDING SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES TO TWO DIMENSIONS -- MULTIDIMENSIONAL PREFERENCES WITH MORE THAN TWO PERSONS AND SOCIAL DECISIONS -- The Pareto Set -- Majority Rule -- Getting Beyond Simple Majority Rule -- RESEARCH FRONTIERS: WAYS FORWARD -- Reexamining and Reformulating Distance -- Goods and Bads -- Aggregate Actors and the Presumption of Rational Choice -- THE UNCOVERED SET: STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY WITH CYCLES -- CONCLUSIONS -- FOR FURTHER READING -- Spatial Models in One Dimension -- Spatial Models in More than One Dimension -- The Democratic Advantage -- PART III: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND QUALITY OUTCOMES -- CHAPTER 6: Political Necessity and the Tethering of Leaders -- THE NECESSITY OF GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS -- POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION -- TETHERING POLITICAL LEADERS -- The Constituent-Beneficiary-Agent Problem -- Credible Commitment |
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REGIME CHANGE -- IN CONCLUSION -- CHAPTER 7: A Few Institutional Pitfalls -- DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS TO GET RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: CHECKS AND BALANCES -- Checks and Balances and Veto Players -- Specialization and Division of Labor and Veto Players -- The Liberal Paradox -- Division of Labor in Policy Formation -- LOCALISM AND ITS LIMITS -- Pork Barrel Politics -- Too Much Democracy, Too Much Freedom? -- RESPONSIVE TO WHOM? -- Turnout and Social Justice -- Money in Electoral Competitions -- Problematic Policy Arenas -- FOR FURTHER READING -- On the Tethering of Political Leaders -- On the Principal-Agent Relation -- On Institutional Design -- On Regime Change -- PART IV: SOCIAL JUSTICE, CHOICE, AND WELFARE -- CHAPTER 8: The General Problem of Collective Welfare and Choice -- SETTING UP THE PROBLEM -- Social Welfare and Democracy: Politically Empowering a Notion of the Good -- Arrow's Argument -- Conflicting Requirements -- Proof of Arrow's Theorem -- A Decisive Group over a Pair of Outcomes Is Decisive over All Pairs of Outcomes -- The Smallest Decisive Group Can Contain No More than a Single Individual -- Discussion of Arrow and Impossibility -- The Result and the Notion of Group Interest -- The Result and Normative Properties of Collective Choice -- CHAPTER 9: Voting Rules -- DEFINING THE ACHIEVABLE -- Majority Rule When There Are but Two Alternatives -- More than Two Alternatives -- Another Property We Might Hope For: Condorcet Ef.ciency -- More Relaxed Systems -- Voting by Veto -- Approval Voting -- THE ROLE OF DISCUSSION AND DELIBERATION -- IN CONCLUSION -- CHAPTER 10: Social Welfare and Social Justice: A Partial Integration -- TO AGGREGATE OR NOT TO AGGREGATE: A FALSE DILEMMA -- WHO IS TO SPECIFY WHAT TO AGGREGATE? -- LOOKING TO SOCIAL JUSTICE TO FIND SOCIAL WELFARE -- A WELFARE FLOOR TO GUARANTEE BASIC NEEDS |
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Toward a Theory of Social Justice -- Empirical Support -- Back to Politics -- MEETING NEEDS: A MEASURE OF DEMOCRATIC SUCCESS -- A PRELIMINARY INVENTORY OF NEEDS -- PRELIMINARY COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES -- HOW TO EXPLAIN THE OBSERVED DIFFERENCES? -- CONCLUSIONS -- FOR FURTHER READING -- Social Welfare and Social Justice -- Voting Rules -- Conclusions: Questions and Lessons -- The Challenges -- Complex Human Behavior -- Complex Political Systems -- Impartial Reasoning in the Real World -- BETTER OUTCOMES, BETTER INSTITUTIONS -- Political Goals -- Non-Violent Succession -- Beyond Physical Security -- Bibliography -- Name Index -- Subject Index |
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Presents the rational choice theories of collective action and social choice, applying them to problems of public policy and social justice |
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Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2020. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries |
| Link |
Print version: Oppenheimer, Joe Principles of Politics : A Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice
New York : Cambridge University Press,c2012 9781107014886
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| Subject |
Political science.;Rational choice theory.;Social justice
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Electronic books
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