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050  4 HD2768.D444 -- W38 2005eb 
082 0  333.71/58/091724 
100 1  Komives, Kristin 
245 10 Water, Electricity, and the Poor :|bWho Benefits from 
       Utility Subsidies? 
264  1 Washington :|bWorld Bank Publications,|c2005 
264  4 |c©2005 
300    1 online resource (306 pages) 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
505 0  Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations 
       and Acronyms -- 1 Introduction -- Infrastructure Services 
       Are Important to Economies and Households -- Many Still 
       Lack Access to Improved Water and Electricity Services -- 
       Are Subsidies the Answer? -- Utility Subsidies Are Also 
       Redistributive Mechanisms -- Objective of This Book: 
       Assessing the Targeting Performance of Subsidies -- 2 A 
       Typology of Consumer Utility Subsidies -- What Types of 
       Consumer Utility Subsidies Exist? -- How Are Subsidies 
       Funded? -- How Prevalent Are Different Types of Subsidies?
       -- Why Are Subsidies So Prevalent? -- Summary -- 3 The 
       Rationale for Subsidizing Services for the Poor -- 
       Subsidies Are Instruments of Sectoral Policy -- Utilities 
       Subsidies Are Also Instruments of Broader Social Policy --
       Summary -- 4 The Determinants of Targeting Performance: A 
       Conceptual Framework -- Data and Methodology -- Conceptual
       Framework: The Determinants of Subsidy Performance -- 
       Summary -- 5 The Targeting Performance of Quantity-Based 
       Subsidies -- A Snapshot of Performance: Quantity-Targeted 
       Subsidies Are Regressive -- The Access Handicap: Only 
       Connected Households Are Potential Beneficiaries -- 
       Metering: A Necessary Condition for Quantity Targeting -- 
       Targeting Potential: Do the Poor Consume Less Than the 
       Rich? -- Beneficiary Targeting in Practice: No One Is 
       Excluded -- Benefit Targeting in Practice: High-Volume 
       Consumers Receive Larger Subsidies -- Summary -- 6 Can the
       Targeting Performance of Consumption Subsidies Be 
       Improved? -- Improvement of Subsidy Performance by 
       Modifying Tariff Design? -- Beyond Quantity Targeting: Can
       Subsidy Performance Be Improved with Administrative 
       Selection? -- Beyond Private Connections: How Do 
       Alternative Forms of Consumption Subsidies Perform? -- 
       Summary -- 7 The Targeting Performance of Connection 
       Subsidies 
505 8  Universal Connection Subsidies: Subsidy Performance If All
       Who Could Benefit Actually Did -- Targeted Connection 
       Subsidies: Can Performance Be Improved? -- Assumptions in 
       the Simulations: Will They Hold in Practice? -- Subsidy 
       Funding and Implementation: How Do They Affect 
       Distributional Incidence? -- Summary -- 8 Consumer Utility
       Subsidies as Instruments of Social Policy -- What Is the 
       Benefit Targeting Performance of Utility Subsidies 
       Relative to Other Transfer Mechanisms? -- What Is the 
       Distribution of Subsidy Benefits Relative to Income? -- Do
       Subsidies Provide Material Benefits for Poor Recipients? -
       - To What Extent Do Subsidies Contribute to Poverty 
       Reduction? -- Summary -- 9 Beyond Subsidies-Other Means of
       Achieving Sectoral Goals -- Cost Reduction Measures: 
       Bringing Down the Cost Recovery Threshold? -- Billing and 
       Payment Systems: Matching the Cash Flow of the Poor? -- 
       Legal and Administrative Barriers: What Removing Nonprice 
       Obstacles Does to Serving the Poor -- Summary -- 10 
       Conclusions -- How Prevalent Are Utility Subsidies? -- How
       Do Standard Quantity-Targeted Utility Subsidies Perform? -
       - Why Do Quantity-Targeted Utility Subsidies Perform So 
       Poorly? -- Do Quantity-Targeted Subsidies Perform 
       Differently for Water and Electricity? -- Is It Possible 
       to Improve the Design of Quantity-Targeted Subsidies? -- 
       Are the Alternatives to Quantity Targeting Any Better? -- 
       Do Connection Subsidies Perform Better Than Consumption 
       Subsidies? -- Do These Conclusions Vary across 
       Geographical Regions? -- Are Utility Subsidies as 
       Effective as Other Measures of Social Protection? -- Do 
       Utility Subsidies Have a Material Impact on Disposable 
       Incomes? -- Are There Viable Alternatives to Utility 
       Subsidies? -- Appendixes -- Appendix A: Case Background --
       Appendix B: Electricity: Coverage, Expenditure, and 
       Consumption 
505 8  Appendix C: Water: Coverage, Expenditure, and Consumption 
       -- Appendix D: Electricity: Consumption Subsidy Data -- 
       Appendix E: Water: Consumption Subsidy Data -- Appendix F:
       Water: Connection Subsidy Data -- Appendix G: Burden Limit
       : Consumption Subsidy Data -- Appendix H: Increasing Block
       Tariff Structures -- Bibliography -- Index -- Boxes -- 2.1
       Quantity-Targeted Subsidies in Tariff Structures -- 2.2 
       Indicative Cost-Recovery Ranges for Water Services -- 2.3 
       Indicative Cost-Recovery Ranges for Electricity -- 3.1 
       Methodologies for Measuring Willingness to Pay -- 5.1 The 
       Challenge of Comparing Consumption Levels of the Rich and 
       the Poor -- 6.1 Funding Colombia's Geographically Targeted
       Subsidy Scheme -- 6.2 Chile's ficha CAS, Reducing the Cost
       of Means Testing -- 6.3 Metering and Water Subsidy 
       Performance in Kathmandu -- 7.1 Determinants of Targeting 
       Performance -- 8.1 An Introduction to Gini Coefficients --
       8.2 Poverty Reduction Effect of the Honduran Electricity 
       Subsidy -- Figures -- 2.1 Who Ultimately Captures 
       Government-Funded Subsidies to Utilities? -- 3.1 
       Willingness to Pay for Water against Full Cost Tariff in 
       Central America -- 3.2 Willingness to Pay for Water Supply
       against Current Tariff in Dehra Dun, India -- 3.3 Monthly 
       Residential Electricity Expenditure Patterns by Region -- 
       3.4 Monthly Residential Water Expenditure Patterns by 
       Region -- 3.5 Affordability of Full Cost Charges for 
       Utility Services in Urban Areas -- 4.1 Decomposing Subsidy
       Performance -- 5.1 Measures of Beneficiary and Benefit 
       Incidence of Quantity-Targeted Subsidies -- 5.2 Effect of 
       Poverty Assumption on Benefit Targeting Performance 
       Indicator -- 5.3 Average Monthly Electricity Consumption 
       per Household, by Quintile -- 5.4 Electricity Consumption 
       among Poor and Nonpoor Households in Guatemala -- 5.5 
       Average Water Consumption per Household by Quintile 
505 8  5.6 Effect of Minimum Consumption Rules and Fixed Charges 
       on Average Price Paid with an Increasing Block Tariff at 
       Different Consumption Levels -- 5.7 Access Factors versus 
       Subsidy Design Factors in Quantity-Targeted Subsidies -- 
       6.1 Relationship between Strata (Assigned by Housing 
       Quality) and Income Deciles in Bogota, Colombia -- 6.2a 
       Benefit and Beneficiary Incidence of Water Consumption 
       Subsidies -- 6.2b Benefit and Beneficiary Incidence of 
       Electricity Consumption Subsidies -- 6.3a Water: Access 
       Factors versus Subsidy Design Factors in Modified IBTs and
       Subsidies Using Administrative Selection -- 6.3b 
       Electricity: Access Factors versus Subsidy Design Factors 
       in Modified IBTs and Subsidies Using Administrative 
       Selection -- 7.1 Performance of Simulated Universal 
       Connection Subsidies -- 7.2 Performance of Connection 
       Subsidies If 50 Percent of Poor Households Choose Not to 
       Connect -- 7.3 Distributive Effect of the Cargo SUMA -- 
       8.1 Inequality in the Distribution of Income versus the 
       Distribution of the Electricity Subsidy in Indian States -
       - 8.2 Average Consumption Subsidy to the Poor as a 
       Percentage of Average Income of the Poor -- Tables -- 1.1 
       Percentage of the Population with Access to Improved Water
       Supply, Sanitation, and Electricity (and Percentage with a
       Household Water Connection) -- 2.1 Typology of Consumer 
       Utility Subsidies -- 2.2 Summary of Evidence on Price and 
       Income Elasticity -- 2.3 Overview of Average Water Tariffs
       and Probable Degree of Cost Recovery -- 2.4 Overview of 
       IBT Tariff Structures for Residential Water Customers -- 
       2.5 Overview of Average Electricity Tariffs and Probable 
       Degree of Cost Recovery -- 2.6 Overview of IBT Tariff 
       Structures for Residential Electricity Customers -- 2.7 
       Summary of Prevalence of Different Types of Subsidies in 
       Water and Electricity -- 2.8 Capital Intensity and Asset 
       Lives for Utility Services 
505 8  3.1 Estimated Cost Ranges for Subsistence Service Levels 
       (US) -- 3.2 Applicability of Arguments for Transfers in 
       Kind across Different Goods -- 3.3 Budget Shares for 
       Different Categories of Goods in Africa (Percentage of 
       Household Budget) -- 3.4 Pseudo Income Elasticities for 
       Different Categories of Goods in Africa -- 4.1 
       Determinants of Consumption Subsidy Performance -- 4.2 
       Residential Electricity and Water Tariff Structures in 
       Cape Verde, 2001 -- 4.3 Decomposition of Determinants of 
       Subsidy Performance in Cape Verde -- 4.4 Determinants of 
       Connection Subsidy Performance Indicators -- 4.5 
       Decomposition of Determinants of Connection Subsidy 
       Performance in Cape Verde -- 5.1 Performance Indicators 
       for Quantity-Based Subsidies -- 5.2 Detailed Decomposition
       of Factors that Contribute to in the African Subsidy Cases
       -- 5.3 Effect of Connection Rate and Metering Rate on 
       Potential Beneficiaries of Quantity-Targeted Subsidies -- 
       5.4 Relationship between Income and Energy Use in 45 
       Cities in 12 Developing Countries: Average KgOE per Capita
       per Month -- 5.5 Summary of Evidence on Income Elasticity 
       of Demand for Water and Electricity -- 5.6 Expected Effect
       of Quantity Targeting on Determinants of Benefit Incidence,
       under Different Assumptions about the Correlation between 
       Income and Consumption -- 6.1 Effects of Tariff 
       Modifications on the Factors That Determine the Benefit 
       Incidence of Quantity-Targeted Subsidies -- 6.2 Targeting 
       Performance of Simulated Improvements to IBT and VDT 
       Design -- 6.3 Targeting Performance of Subsidy Models That
       Use Administrative Selection -- 6.4 Percentage of 
       Households That Qualify for Burden Limit Subsidy as Burden
       Limit Changes -- 7.1 Connection Charges for Water and 
       Sewerage (US) -- 7.2 Performance Indicators for Simulated 
       Targeted Connection Subsidies 
505 8  7.3 Benefit Targeting Performance of Connection Subsidies 
       under Three Scenarios 
520    "This book is an extremely thorough and readable review of
       how effective utility subsidies are in reaching the poor. 
       It makes sobering reading for policy makers who have 
       implemented such subsidy programmes, who are looking for 
       ways to ameliorate heavy price increases, or who believed 
       that these subsidies were useful instruments for 
       alleviating poverty." - Catherine Waddams, Director, 
       Center for Competition PolicySchool of Management, 
       University of East Anglia, United Kingdom "This study 
       makes a fine contribution, theoretical and empirical, in 
       an area where much nonsense has been preached, and many 
       misconceptions have long been accepted as gospel. 
       Analyzing a mass of material, the authors quantify the 
       extent to which the most commonly applied forms of utility
       subsidies are regressive. And they then offer a range of 
       practical measures that can be taken to correct the 
       problem."- John Nellis, Senior Fellow Center for Global 
       Development, Washington, DC While consumer utility 
       subsidies are widespread in both the water and electricity
       sectors, their effectiveness in reaching and distributing 
       resources to the poor is the subject of much debate. Water,
       Electricity, and the Poor brings together empirical 
       evidence on subsidy performance across a wide range of 
       countries. It documents the prevalence of consumer 
       subsidies, provides a typology of the many variants found 
       in the developing world, and presents a number of 
       indicators useful in assessing the degree to which such 
       subsidies benefit the poor, focusing on three key concepts
       : beneficiary incidence, benefit incidence, and 
       materiality. The findings on subsidy performance will be 
       useful to policy makers, utility regulators, and sector 
       practitioners who are contemplating introducing, 
       eliminating, or modifying utility subsidies, and to those 
       who view consumer utility subsidies as a social protection
520 8  instrument 
588    Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other
       sources 
590    Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest 
       Ebook Central, 2020. Available via World Wide Web. Access 
       may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated 
       libraries 
650  0 Public utilities -- Rates -- Developing 
       countries.;Subsidies -- Developing countries 
655  4 Electronic books 
700 1  Foster, Vivien 
700 1  Halpern, Jonathan 
700 1  Wodon, Quentin 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aKomives, Kristin|tWater, Electricity, 
       and the Poor : Who Benefits from Utility Subsidies?
       |dWashington : World Bank Publications,c2005
       |z9780821363423 
856 40 |uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sinciatw/
       detail.action?docID=459550|zClick to View