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Author Finlay, Stephen (Professor)
Title Confusion of Tongues : a theory of normative language / Stephen Finlay
Imprint New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2014
book jacket
 Euro-Am Studies Lib  170.42 F4964 2014    DUE 08-20-23  -  30500101497462
 人文社會聯圖  P99.4.P72 F56 2014    AVAILABLE    30630020075055
Descript viii, 278 pages ; 25 cm
text rdacontent
unmediated rdamedia
volume rdacarrier
Series Oxford moral theory
Oxford moral theory
Note Includes bibliographical references (pages 259-271) and index
1. Introduction -- 2. A Good Word to Start With -- 3. The Probable Meaning of 'Ought' -- 4. Explaining Reasons -- 5. Pragmatics and Practicality -- 6. Multiple Ends -- 7. Categorical and Final -- 8. A Disagreeable Problem -- 9. Conclusion
"Can normative words like "good," "ought," and "reason" be defined in entirely non-normative terms? Confusion of Tongues argues that they can, advancing a new End-Relational theory of the meaning of this language as providing the best explanation of the many different ways it is ordinarily used. Philosophers widely maintain that analyzing normative language as describing facts about relations cannot account for special features of particularly moral and deliberative uses of normative language, but Stephen Finlay argues that the End-Relational theory systematically explains these on the basis of a single fundamental principle of conversational pragmatics. These challenges comprise the central problems of metaethics, including the connection between normative judgment and motivation, the categorical character of morality, the nature of intrinsic value, and the possibility of normative disagreement. Finlay's linguistic analysis has deep implications for the metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology of morality, as well as for the nature and possibility of normative ethical theory. Most significantly it supplies a nuanced answer to the ancient Euthyphro Question of whether we desire things because we judge them good, or vice versa. Normative speech and thought may ultimately be just a manifestation of our nature as intelligent animals motivated by contingent desires for various conflicting ends"-- Provided by publisher
Subject Pragmatics
Normativity (Ethics)
Meaning (Philosophy)
Linguistic analysis (Linguistics)
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