MARC 主機 00000nam  2200349   4500 
001    AAI3378446 
005    20111129081002.5 
008    111129s2009    ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d 
020    9781109410846 
035    (UMI)AAI3378446 
040    UMI|cUMI 
100 1  Kerner, Andrew 
245 14 The political economy of investor protection 
300    234 p 
500    Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-
       11, Section: A, page: 4445 
500    Adviser: Eric Reinhardt 
502    Thesis (Ph.D.)--Emory University, 2009 
520    Adequate legal protections for minority shareholders are a
       powerful determinant of capital market performance and 
       economic growth, yet there is surprising variation across 
       countries and across US states in the extent to which 
       minority shareholders are protected from rent-seeking by 
       corporate insiders. My dissertation seeks to explain this 
       variation. On the basis of a formal model that builds on 
       work by Grossman and Helpman (1996), Rogowski and Kayser 
       (2002) and others, I hypothesize that the key drivers of 
       corporate governance and securities law policies are (1) 
       the vulnerability of incumbent governments to economic 
       voting, which is itself a function of political 
       institutions, (2) competitive pressures to attract 
       investment capital by enacting shareholder-friendly laws, 
       and (3) the role of institutional investors, particularly 
       large pension funds, in the lobbying process 
520    I test my hypotheses in three substantively and 
       methodologically distinct empirical chapters. The first of
       these chapters (chapter 4) features a series of large-N, 
       cross-national statistical tests that evaluate the impact 
       of political institutions, competitive diffusion and 
       funded pension assets on the adoption and enforcement of 
       insider trading laws and the extent of shareholder voting 
       rights 
520    My dissertation's remaining empirical chapters examine the
       role of pension funds in the policy making process in more
       detail and with more analytical clarity. The first of 
       these chapters (chapter 5) is a statistical analysis of 
       state employee retirement funds' impact on US-state-level 
       anti-takeover legislation during the 1980s and early 
       1990s. The second of these chapters (chapter 6) is a 
       qualitative, interview based case study exploring the role
       of Polish pension funds in a recent flurry of corporate 
       governance and securities law reforms in that country. 
       Like their American counterparts, these pension funds are 
       extremely large. Relative to the size of the Polish stock 
       market, the largest of them are 2-3 times as large as the 
       largest American pension funds. Unlike their American 
       counterparts, however, Polish pension funds have been 
       passive in corporate governance issues. I argue that the 
       regulatory regime they face incentivizes these pension 
       funds to be as passive as they have been 
590    School code: 0665 
650  4 Political Science, International Law and Relations 
690    0616 
710 2  Emory University.|bPolitical Science 
773 0  |tDissertation Abstracts International|g70-11A 
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