MARC 主機 00000cam  2200397 i 4500 
001    19148272 
005    20170613155352.0 
008    160623s2017    enka     b    001 0 eng c 
010    2016945573 
020    9780198793397 
035    (OCoLC)ocn955312908 
042    pcc 
043    e------ 
050 00 JN30|b.W57 2017 
100 1  Winzen, Thomas,|eauthor 
245 10 Constitutional preferences and parliamentary reform :
       |bexplaining national parliaments' adaptation to European 
       integration /|cThomas Winzen 
250    First edition 
264  1 Oxford, United Kingdom ;|aNew York, NY :|bOxford 
       University Press,|c2017 
300    xii, 229 pages :|billustrations ;|c25 cm 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
336    still image|bsti|2rdacontent 
337    unmediated|bn|2rdamedia 
338    volume|bnc|2rdacarrier 
504    Includes bibliographical references (pages 209-228) and 
520 8  "This book provides a comprehensive account of national 
       parliaments' adaptation to European integration. Advancing
       an explanation based on political parties' constitutional 
       preferences, the volume investigates the nature and 
       variation of parliamentary rights in European Union 
       affairs across countries and levels of governance. In some
       member states, parliaments have traditionally been strong 
       and parties hold intergovernmental visions of European 
       integration. In these countries, strong parliamentary 
       rights emerge in the context of parties' efforts to 
       realise their preferred constitutional design for the 
       European polity. Parliamentary rights remain weakly 
       developed where federally-oriented parties prevail, and 
       where parliaments have long been marginal arenas in 
       domestic politics. Moreover, divergent constitutional 
       preferences underlie inter-parliamentary disagreement on 
       national parliaments' collective rights at the European 
       level. Constitutional preferences are key to understanding
       why a 'Senate' of national parliaments never enjoyed 
       support and why the alternatives subsequently put into 
       place have stayed clear of committing national parliaments
       to any common policies. This volume calls into question 
       existing explanations that focus on strategic partisan 
       incentives arising from minority and coalition government.
       Furthermoe, it rejects the exclusive attribution of 
       parliamentary 'deficits' to the structural constraints 
       created by European integration and, instead, restores a 
       sense of accountability for parliamentary rights to 
       political parties and their ideas for the European Union's
       constitutional design"--|cProvided by publisher 
610 20 European Union 
610 27 European Union.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst00916630 
650  0 Cabinet system|zEuropean Union countries 
650  7 Cabinet system.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst00843554 
650  7 Politics and government.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst01919741 
651  0 European Union countries|xPolitics and government 
651  7 Europe|zEuropean Union countries.|2fast
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 人文社會聯圖  JN30 .W57 2017    在架上    30650020069510