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作者 Figueroa Gonzalez, Nicolas Andres
書名 Two essays in mechanism design
國際標準書號 9780542734779
book jacket
說明 60 p
附註 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-06, Section: A, page: 2271
Adviser: Marcel Richter
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2006
In chapter 1 we characterize the revenue maximizing allocation mechanism for a risk neutral seller that owns N, possibly heterogeneous, objects and faces I risk neutral buyers with very general preferences, which allow for complements, substitutes and externalities. Buyers care about the entire allocation of the objects, even if they do not win any, so the auction outcome may affect them also when they do not to participate, and these non-participation payoffs may very well depend on their type. The main novel message of our analysis is that with type-dependent non-participation payoffs, the revenue maximizing assignment of objects can crucially depend on the outside options that buyers face. Outside options can therefore affect the degree of efficiency of revenue maximizing auctions. We show that sometimes an optimal mechanism will allocate the objects in an ex-post efficient way, and other times buyers will obtain objects more often than it is efficient. Our characterization rings a bell of caution. Modeling buyers' outside options as being independent of their private information, is with loss of generality and can lead to quite misleading intuitions
In chapter 2 we consider a government selling monopoly rights to operate in a certain sector of the economy. The government, a benevolent social planner, is interested in maximizing social surplus, measured as a weighted sum of the consumers' utility. We embed the analysis in a general equilibrium framework, so that consumers are shareholders of the competing firms. For a significant class of environments we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the possibility of implementing an ex-post efficient allocation rule and, when it is possible, we derive the mechanism that implements it. We also show it is possible to implement welfare functions with a non-monotonic relation to profits. For those cases, we show that the second-price sealed auction, usually considered as "efficient", is not efficient, and dominated by a mechanism that we explicitly construct
School code: 0130
DDC
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 67-06A
主題 Economics, Theory
0511
Alt Author University of Minnesota
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