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作者 Gumbau-Brisa, Fabia
書名 Essays in macroeconomics and innovation
國際標準書號 0496790945
book jacket
說明 144 p
附註 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-05, Section: A, page: 1879
Chairman: David Laibson
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2004
The first two chapters of this dissertation analyze a monetary policy framework with monopolistic competition and Imperfect Common Knowledge in general equilibrium. In particular, it studies inflation persistence and the dynamics of output and inflation, within a rational expectations model, where monetary policy is set through a Taylor rule that is subject to shocks. Monetary non-neutralities and inflation persistence are endogenous, even though prices can adjust in every period. Stronger anti-inflationary systematic policy or weaker sensitivity to the output gap reduce the extent of strategic complementarities in pricing, leading to a reduction in nominal rigidities and inflation inertia. A simple calibration exercise finds that around 30% of the relevant quarterly monetary policy information is processed by price-setters. Chapter 1 also derives the implied rational expectations backward-looking Phillips Curve. Credibly pre-announced deflations are not expansive and may result in recessions when they take place. Better monetary policy information reduces inertia by making households' beliefs more homogeneous. This reduces the sacrifice ratio from disinflations, and the dispersion of both individual inflation forecasts and relative prices. Chapter 2 extends the model presented in Chapter 1, adding realism to the dynamics of output and inflation generated after a monetary policy shock. This is done by introducing habit-formation in consumption, which smooths the output response over time, and establishes interdependence of current aggregate demand on past market conditions, resulting in increased inflation inertia
The third and last chapter, joint with Michael Kremer, studies the relative efficiency of two broad types of intervention geared towards promoting R&D. The two types of subsidies are pull mechanisms, which provide funding once the innovation has taken place, and push mechanisms, which finance research along the innovation process. It is shown that despite push mechanisms always dominate in the absence of moral hazard and access problems, once those two problems are accounted for, the result is likely to be reversed. Additionally, unlike with push programs, pull subsidies provide incentives to improve the technology used to generate the innovation, since the subsidy is contingent on success
School code: 0084
DDC
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 65-05A
主題 Economics, General
Economics, Theory
0501
0511
Alt Author Harvard University
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