MARC 主機 00000cam  2200337 a 4500 
001    426391153 
003    OCoLC 
005    20120906131804.0 
008    090717s2010    maua     b    001 0 eng   
010    2009029574 
020    9780262013796 (hbk. : alk. paper) 
020    0262013797 (hbk. : alk. paper) 
035    (OCoLC)426391153 
040    DLC|cDLC|dUKM|dAS|beng|dEAS 
050 00 HC85|b.N36 2010 
082 00 333.7|222 
245 04 The natural resources trap :|bprivate investment without 
       public commitment /|cedited by William Hogan and Federico 
260    Cambridge, Mass. :|bMIT Press,|cc2010 
300    xiv, 519 p. :|bill ;|c24 cm 
504    Includes bibliographical references and index 
505 0  Contracts and investment in natural resources / William 
       Hogan, Federico Sturzenegger, and Laurence Tai -- 
       Petroleum contracts : what does contract theory tell us? /
       Philippe Aghion and Luzía Quesada -- Sovereign theft : 
       theory and evidence about sovereign default and 
       expropriation / Michael Tomz and Mark L.J. Wright -- A 
       resource belief curse? Oil and individualism / Rafael Di 
       Tella, Juan Dubra, and Robert MacCulloch -- Optimal 
       resource extraction contracts under threat of 
       expropriation / Eduardo Engel and Ronald Fischer -- 
       Denying the temptation to GRAB / Nils Wernerfelt and 
       Richard Zeckhauser -- Dealing with expropriations : 
       general guidelines for oil production contracts / Roberto 
       Rigobon -- Pricing expropriation risk in natural resource 
       contracts : a real options approach / Eduardo S. Schwartz 
       and Anders B. Trolle -- Credibility, commitment, and 
       regulation : ex ante price caps and ex post interventions 
       / Dieter Helm -- Hydrocarbon policy, shocks, and the 
       collective imagination : what went wrong in Bolivia? / 
       Fernando H. Navajas -- Urgency and betrayal : three 
       attempts to foster private investment in Argentina's oil 
       industry / Nicolás Gadano -- The political economy of oil 
       contract renegotiation in Venezuela / Osmel Manzano and 
       Francisco Monaldi -- Epilogue : Populism and natural 
       resources workshop / Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani 
520    "Volatility in commodity prices has been accompanied by 
       perpetual renegotiation of contracts between private 
       investors in natural resource production and the 
       governments of states with mineral and energy wealth. When
       prices skyrocket, governments want a larger share of 
       revenues, sometimes to the point of nationalization or 
       expropriation; when prices fall, larger state 
       participation becomes a burden and the private sector is 
       called back in. Recent and newsworthy changes in the price
       of oil (which fell from an all-time high of $147 in mid-
       2008 to $40 by year's end) are notable for their speed and
       the steepness of their rise and fall, but the up-and-down 
       pattern itself is not unusual. If the unpredictability of 
       commodity prices is so predictable, why do contracts not 
       allow for this with mechanisms that would provide a more 
       stable commercial framework? 
520    In The Natural Resources Trap, top scholars address this 
       question in terms of both theory and practice. Theoretical
       contributions range across a number of fields, from 
       contract theory to public finance, and treat topics that 
       include taxation, royalties, and expropriation cycles. 
       Case studies examine experiences in the U.K., Bolivia, 
       Argentina, Venezuela, and other parts of the world."--pub.
650  0 Natural resources|xGovernment policy 
650  0 Natural resources|xLaw and legislation 
650  0 Investments, Foreign 
650  0 Public-private sector cooperation 
700 1  Hogan, William W 
700 1  Sturzenegger, Federico 
776 1  |cElectronic resource $z 9780262296823 
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 歐美所圖書館  333.7 N2194ho 2010    在架上  -  30500101488685