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作者 Kerner, Andrew
書名 The political economy of investor protection
國際標準書號 9781109410846
book jacket
說明 234 p
附註 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-11, Section: A, page: 4445
Adviser: Eric Reinhardt
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Emory University, 2009
Adequate legal protections for minority shareholders are a powerful determinant of capital market performance and economic growth, yet there is surprising variation across countries and across US states in the extent to which minority shareholders are protected from rent-seeking by corporate insiders. My dissertation seeks to explain this variation. On the basis of a formal model that builds on work by Grossman and Helpman (1996), Rogowski and Kayser (2002) and others, I hypothesize that the key drivers of corporate governance and securities law policies are (1) the vulnerability of incumbent governments to economic voting, which is itself a function of political institutions, (2) competitive pressures to attract investment capital by enacting shareholder-friendly laws, and (3) the role of institutional investors, particularly large pension funds, in the lobbying process
I test my hypotheses in three substantively and methodologically distinct empirical chapters. The first of these chapters (chapter 4) features a series of large-N, cross-national statistical tests that evaluate the impact of political institutions, competitive diffusion and funded pension assets on the adoption and enforcement of insider trading laws and the extent of shareholder voting rights
My dissertation's remaining empirical chapters examine the role of pension funds in the policy making process in more detail and with more analytical clarity. The first of these chapters (chapter 5) is a statistical analysis of state employee retirement funds' impact on US-state-level anti-takeover legislation during the 1980s and early 1990s. The second of these chapters (chapter 6) is a qualitative, interview based case study exploring the role of Polish pension funds in a recent flurry of corporate governance and securities law reforms in that country. Like their American counterparts, these pension funds are extremely large. Relative to the size of the Polish stock market, the largest of them are 2-3 times as large as the largest American pension funds. Unlike their American counterparts, however, Polish pension funds have been passive in corporate governance issues. I argue that the regulatory regime they face incentivizes these pension funds to be as passive as they have been
School code: 0665
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 70-11A
主題 Political Science, International Law and Relations
0616
Alt Author Emory University. Political Science
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