MARC 主機 00000nam  2200361   4500 
001    AAI3413425 
005    20110506125611.5 
008    110506s2010    ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d 
020    9781124141220 
035    (UMI)AAI3413425 
040    UMI|cUMI 
100 1  Macera Parra, Rosario Claudia 
245 10 Essays on reference-dependent preferences 
300    91 p 
500    Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-
       09, Section: A, page: 3372 
500    Advisers: Botond Koszegi; Matthew Rabin 
502    Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2010 
520    This dissertation consists of two chapters exploring the 
       economic implications of reference-dependent preferences 
       over incentive design and belief formation 
520    The first chapter studies the intertemporal allocation of 
       incentives in a repeated moral hazard model. Beside 
       consumption utility, reference-dependent agents experience
       utility from changes in their expectations about present 
       and future income caused by the performance measure 
       realization. In contrast to the prediction with classical 
       preferences but consistent with real-world contracts, this
       paper shows that if consumption utility is not too concave
       and if changes in expectations about present income 
       carries sufficiently larger weight in utility than changes
       in expectations about future income, the optimal contract 
       defers all present incentives into future payments by 
       setting a present fixed wage. Despite this prediction, I 
       further prove that several standard features of the 
       contract with classical preferences---no rents to the 
       agent, conditions to achieve first-best cost and non-
       optimality of random contracts---still hold 
520    The second chapter studies the temporal path of subjective
       beliefs when a reference-dependent agent who experiences 
       standard anticipatory utility and utility from changes in 
       these anticipatory feelings waits T periods for a binary 
       outcome realization. Following the optimal beliefs 
       literature, in each period the agent chooses a belief 
       about her likelihood of success to maximize her 
       intertemporal utility. Consistent with the empirical 
       evidence, the model predicts that optimism decreases as 
       the pay-off date approaches if the outcome is important 
       enough or if the agent is sufficiently loss averse. 
       Intuitively, when the pay-off date is distant 
       disappointment is less salient than the joy of hoping 
       favorable outcomes; as the realization date gets closer, 
       however, the threat of disappointment becomes important. 
       Applying the model to the optimal timing of productivity 
       bonuses, I find these should be granted as frequently as 
       possible because optimism acts as a non-pecuniary 
       motivator that allows the principal to induce the desired 
       effort path at a cheaper expected cost 
590    School code: 0028 
650  4 Economics, Theory 
690    0511 
710 2  University of California, Berkeley.|bEconomics 
773 0  |tDissertation Abstracts International|g71-09A 
856 40 |u