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作者 Rokas, Konstantinos N
書名 Essays in political economy and industrial organization
國際標準書號 9781109252989
book jacket
說明 91 p
附註 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-07, Section: A, page: 2662
Adviser: Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2009
This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first two discuss sequential elections and the last one discusses the effects of merchant surcharging on credit card users
In the first chapter (co-authored with Vinayak Tripathi), we examine an electoral framework in which agents can strategically choose when to vote and can observe the votes of those who precede them. This is in contrast to the literature on Condorcet's Jury Theorem which has limited its attention to simultaneous and sequential voting games. We show that in a common value setting, such an election aggregates information efficiently regardless of the voting rule or the size of the electorate. The proposed election format ensures that the Jury Theorem obtains for an electorate with differentially informed agents. Under more restrictive conditions, this framework can also produce the efficient outcome in environments where voters have conflicting interests or the size of the electorate is uncertain. Finally, we examine the performance of the election when private signals are multidimensional
In the second chapter, we compare Nash Equilibria of private-value elections under simultaneous and sequential voting, where voters know their ideal candidate, but do not know how many other voters share their preferences. For the case of two candidates, we show that the sequential election can prevent dominated equilibria present in the simultaneous election under certain conditions. Next, we extend our results to the case of three candidates. Finally, we provide a setting with a sequential election with three candidates in which later voters observe early votes to determine which vote is more likely to be pivotal, illustrating that the sequential election can convey information in a way that is impossible in a simultaneous election
In the third chapter, we study the positive effect of the no-surcharge rule in restraining upstream and downstream market power (double marginalization). We study settings where credit card firms compete and thus have limited upstream market power as well as monopolist credit cards. Comparing consumer welfare under a merchant surcharging and a no-merchant surcharging rule, we find that a monopolist merchant that can surcharge charges excessively, resulting in too little card use. A no-surcharge rule can act as an effective deterrent and can never make consumers worse off in any of the cases we study
School code: 0181
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 70-07A
主題 Business Administration, Management
Economics, Theory
Political Science, General
0454
0511
0615
Alt Author Princeton University
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