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作者 Shah, Manisha Bipin
書名 Risk behavior, occupational choice, and regulation of sex workers: Evidence from Ecuador and Mexico
國際標準書號 9780542826511
book jacket
說明 94 p
附註 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3091
Adviser: Ethan Ligon
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2006
While condoms are an effective defense against the transmission of HIV and other sexually transmitted infections, large numbers of sex workers are not using them with their clients. Chapter 2 investigates why sex workers risk infection by not using condoms despite mass education and prevention programs emphasizing otherwise. Using the general principle of compensating wage differentials where a number of economists have documented that, higher wages compensate for risky activities in labor sectors, we find that Mexican sex workers are willing to take the extra risk if clients are willing to pay more to avoid using condoms. Using a panel data set, from Mexico, we estimate that sex workers received a 23 percent premium for unprotected sex from clients who requested not to use a condom. The premium represents a present value of a life year of $15,000 to $50,000 or one to five times annual earnings. The premium jumped to 46 percent if the sex worker was considered very attractive, a measure of bargaining power. These results are consistent with a theoretical bargaining model of commercial sex presented in this chapter
The third and fourth chapters of this dissertation study the public health effects of enforcing licensing requirements in a two-sector commercial sex market, where enforcement varies between sectors. Several countries are pursuing the regulation of commercial sex work in order to decrease the spread of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and reduce the probability of a generalized HIV/AIDS epidemic. In many Latin American countries, the commercial sex market is characterized by two sectors, brothel and street, where the latter is marked by riskier behavior (e.g., lower rates of condom use) and higher prevalence of STIs. In Chapter 3, we use nationally representative data from Ecuador to examine the effects on condom use and STI prevalence of enforcement in brothels vs. enforcement in the street. We exploit regional variation in the frequency of police visits to verify sex worker compliance with licensing requirements. The findings indicate that increasing enforcement in the street sector significantly increases condom use by 11 percent and decreases sexually transmitted infections by 8 percent, yet increasing enforcement in brothels has no significant effect
Chapter 4 proposes a theoretical model that explains this divergence as a consequence of sex workers' sectoral choice. Increasing enforcement on the street unambiguously improves public health outcomes by encouraging sex workers to enter the more regulated brothel sector, where STI prevalence is lower. Increasing enforcement in the brothel sector induces counteracting effects, as some sex workers choose to comply with the licensing requirements (and undertake less risky behavior as a result), but others move to the street sector and are exposed to greater risk of infection. To minimize perverse incentive effects of regulation, enforcement should take into account the underlying characteristics of the commercial sex market, and should be concentrated in the sector which is marked by lower condom use and higher STI prevalence
School code: 0028
DDC
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 67-08A
主題 Health Sciences, Occupational Health and Safety
Economics, General
Economics, Labor
Health Sciences, Public Health
0354
0501
0510
0573
Alt Author University of California, Berkeley
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