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作者 Whipple, John
書名 Leibniz's metaphysics of creation and finite substance
國際標準書號 9780542991691
book jacket
說明 181 p
附註 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-11, Section: A, page: 4215
Adviser: Alan Nelson
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Irvine, 2007
This dissertation is a study of three central features of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's mature metaphysics: his theories of finite substance, spontaneity, and creation. The study is divided into a critical phase and a positive phase. In the former I draw out several serious but largely unrecognized problems that would plague Leibniz's mature metaphysics if standard interpretations of his theories of finite substance, spontaneity, and creation were correct. I initiate this phase of the study by focusing on an important yet largely neglected question: what is the ontological status of the successive states of finite substances? Standard interpretations of Leibniz's theories of finite substance and spontaneity assume both that successive states are basic (or fully-real), and that such a commitment is compatible with Leibniz's broader metaphysical system. I argue that this is not at all the case: a commitment to the full reality of monadic states would be incompatible with Leibniz's resolution of the continuum problem, and it would undermine Leibniz's commitment to an ontology of enduring substances, among other things. In the positive phase of the study I argue that Leibniz's considered position on the ontological status of successive states is that they are phenomenal. Alternative interpretations of Leibniz's theories of finite substance, spontaneity, and creation are presented that are in keeping with this general thesis. I argue that if the thesis is correct, then Leibniz can be absolved of the problems raised in the critical phase of the study. The thesis allows for a satisfying explanation of the ontological relation between a substance and its successive states; it helps to explain how Leibniz's theory of spontaneity differs from Malebranche's occasionalism; and it serves to explain a feature of Leibniz's metaphysics that has mystified commentators for many years---his commitment to the thesis that finite substances are atemporal
School code: 0030
Host Item Dissertation Abstracts International 67-11A
主題 Philosophy
Alt Author University of California, Irvine
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