| 說明 |
114 p |
| 附註 |
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-05, Section: A, page: 2060 |
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Advisers: Qinghai Wang; Lilian Ng |
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, 2007 |
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This dissertation investigates mutual fund managers' portfolio decisions and their roles in corporate governance. In Chapter 1, I discuss whether and how corporate executives influence money managers' investment decisions. I find when corporate executives move from one firm to another, mutual funds that have investment experience with these moving executives are more likely to follow them by investing in their new firms. Further evidence suggests that such follow-the-leader behavior is partly driven by funds' preference for corporate management's skills or management styles, partly driven by their social relationship. In Chapter 2, I investigate mutual funds' proxy voting behaviors. I find that funds with large ownership in the involved firms tend to vote with corporate management, even the proposals may not be in the interests of shareholders. I also find that the presence of mutual funds with large ownership is negatively related to the number of harmful proposals sponsored by the firm. The evidence suggests that mutual funds' proxy voting decisions may be influenced by their private negotiation activities |
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School code: 0263 |
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DDC |
| Host Item |
Dissertation Abstracts International 68-05A
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| 主題 |
Business Administration, Management
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Economics, Finance
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0454
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0508
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| Alt Author |
The University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee
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