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作者 Powell, Robert, 1956 July 7-, author
書名 Nuclear deterrence theory : the search for credibility / Robert Powell
出版項 Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1990
國際標準書號 0521375274 (hardback)
book jacket
館藏地 索書號 處理狀態 OPAC 訊息 條碼
 歐美所圖書館  333.7924 P8715 1990    在架上    30500100550378
說明 viii, 230 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
text txt rdacontent
unmediated n rdamedia
volume nc rdacarrier
附註 Includes bibliographical references (pages 221-225) and index
Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation
Machine derived contents note: Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility -- 3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship -- 4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises -- 5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age -- 6. Stability and the lack of control -- 7. The strategy of limited retaliation -- 8. An appraisal -- Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory -- References -- Index
主題 Deterrence (Strategy)
Nuclear warfare
Nuclear power Political aspects
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