| | TABLES | xiv |
| | ILLUSTRATIONS | xvii |
| {272d59} | INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| | | Research Problem | 1 |
| | | Working Hypothesis | 2 |
| | | Research Design | 3 |
| | | Data Base | 9 |
| {272d5a} | BACKGROUND OF THE REPRESENTATION PROBLEM | 11 |
| | | Consideration by the security Council | 12 |
| | | Secretary General Lie's Proposal | 16 |
| | | American Attitude Toward Chinese Representation | 18 |
| | | Consideration by the General Assembly at Its Fifth Session | 19 |
| | | PRC"Not Peace Loving" | 25 |
| {272d5b} | POLL-CALLS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION UNDER THE MORATORIUM DEVICE,1951-1960 | 28 |
| | | Communist China'sAttitude Toward the UN | 28 |
| | | Peking's Alliance with Soviet Bloc | 29 |
| | | Consideration by the General Assembly at Its Sixth Session | 30 |
| | | Taiwan as Part of Line of Defense | 32 |
| | | Consideration postponed by US Procedural Motion | 33 |
| | | US Policy Toward Chinese Representation in the Un | 36 |
| | | Analysis of the Vote | 39 |
| | | Shifting of the Vote | 42 |
| | | The Parliamentary Strategy of Voting | 51 |
| | | The Norms of Regimes andTheir Votes on the Moratorium Resolution | 51 |
| {272d5c} | ROLL-CALLS ON CHINES REPRESENTATION UNDER THE RESOLTION DECLARING THE MATTER AN "IMPORTANT QUESTION,"1961-1970 | 58 |
| | | Nonreognition Policy Continued Under Kennedy Administration | 58 |
| | | Important Question Strategy | 59 |
| | | The Assembly Debate:A Variety of Viewpoints | 61 |
| | | Nationalist Chinese Position | 64 |
| | | Tow-Thirds Majority Require | 67 |
| | | Analysis of 1961 Vote | 69 |
| | | The two Chinas in Africa and the 1962 Vote | 70 |
| | | The 1965 Vote | 73 |
| | | PRC Setbacks and the Cultural Revolution | 82 |
| | | RE-establishment and the 1970 Vote | 85 |
| | | The Voting Patterns for the 1960's | 88 |
| | | The Norms of Regimes and Their Votes on Chinese Voting Representation During the 1960's | 110 |
| {272d5d} | DUAL REPRESENTATION: THE TWO-CHINA PROPOSAL,1971 | 121 |
| | | Modification of the United States Attitude | 121 |
| | | Votes on the Italian Resolution,1966-68 | 124 |
| | | The China"Breakthrough" Under the Nixon Administration | 128 |
| | | Consideration by the General Assembly at Its Twenty-Sixth Session | 132 |
| | | Analysis of 1971 Vote | 137 |
| {272d5e} | AID TRADE CAUCUSES AND DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION AS DETERMINANTS OF UN VOTES ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION | 141 |
| | | Diplomatic Recognition as a Technique of Foreign Policy | 141 |
| | | UN Caucuses and the Roll-Calls | 145 |
| | | Political and Strategic Motives of Foreign Aid | 146 |
| | | The Cold War and East-West Trade | 148 |
| | | Multiple Regression Analysis | 152 |
| | | UN Votes on Chinese Representation:Regression Analyses | 160 |
| {272d5f} | CONCLUSION | 171 |
| | | APPENDIXES | 177 |
| | | A.Texts of UN Resolutions Concerning the People's Republic of China (Korean Aggression,Trade Embargo,Prisoners) | 177 |
| | | B.UN Caucuses and Their Members(as of November 1971) | 182 |
| | | C.Communist China's Aid to, and Diplomatic Relations with, the Third,1949-April 1972 (Aid as of January 1970) | 183 |
| | BIBLIOGRAPHY | 185 |
| | INDEX | 213 |
