Record:   Prev Next
作者 Gill, Michael B
書名 Humean moral pluralism / Michael B. Gill
出版項 New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2014
國際標準書號 9780198714033 (hbk.)
0198714033 (hbk.)
book jacket
館藏地 索書號 處理狀態 OPAC 訊息 條碼
 文哲所  143.72 G475    在架上    30580003125916
 人社中心  B1499.E8 G54 2014    在架上    30560400476567
 人文社會聯圖  B1499.E8 G54 2014    到期 01-06-21    30660020135146
版本 First edition
說明 vi, 242 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
text rdacontent
unmediated rdamedia
volume rdacarrier
附註 Includes bibliographical references and index
Michael B. Gill offers an original account of Humean moral pluralism. Moral pluralism is the view that there are different ultimate moral reasons for action, that those different reasons can sometimes come into conflict with each other, and that there exist no invariable ordering principles that tell us how to resolve such conflicts. If moral pluralism is true, we will at times have to act on moral decisions for which we can give no fully principled justification. Humeanism is the view that our moral judgments are based on our sentiments, that reason alone could not have given rise to our moral judgments, and that there are no mind-independent moral properties for our moral judgments to track. In this book, Gill shows that the combination of these two views produces a more accurate account of our moral experiences than the monistic, rationalist, and non-naturalist alternatives. He elucidates the historical origins of the Humean pluralist position in the works of David Hume, Adam Smith, and their eighteenth century contemporaries, and explains how recent work in moral psychology has advanced this position. And he argues for the position's superiority to the non-naturalist pluralism of W.D. Ross and the monism of Kantianism and consequentialism
主題 Pluralism
Conduct of life
Hume, David, 1711-1776
Record:   Prev Next