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作者 Sehon, Scott Robert, 1963- author
書名 Free will and action explanation : a non-causal, compatibilist account / Scott Sehon
出版項 Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2016
國際標準書號 9780198758495
0198758499
book jacket
館藏地 索書號 處理狀態 OPAC 訊息 條碼
 文哲所  199 S456    在架上    30580003315301
說明 xii, 239 pages ; 24 cm
text txt rdacontent
unmediated n rdamedia
volume nc rdacarrier
附註 Includes bibliographical reference (pages [225]-233) and index
Acknowledgments. Introduction: what's at stake in the free will debate? Part 1 The teleological account of action : Teleology and interpretation -- Rationalizability and irrationality -- Other objections to the teleological account -- Rationalizing principles and causal explanation -- Deviant causal chains -- The commitments of common-sense psychology. Part 2 The teleological account of free will and responsibility : Application to free will: non-causal compatibilism -- Irrational actions and freedom -- Extraordinary cases -- How the teleological account undermines arguments for incompatibilism -- Epistemic problems for other accounts of free will -- Concluding thoughts. References -- Index
Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon argues that we can make progress on these questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. Part I of the book proposes and defends a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behavior is irreducibly teleological rather than causal. Part II applies the teleological account of action to free will and responsibility, arguing that the free actions-the ones for which we are directly responsible. It is then argued that this non-causal account of action undermines the appeal of incompatibilist arguments, arguments attempting to show that free will is not compatible with determinism. Beyond this, Sehon argues that the non-causal compatibilist account works well in practice: it is in accord with our clear intuitions about cases, and it both explains and provides guidance in the cases where our intuitions are murkier
主題 Free will and determinism
Explanation
Act (Philosophy)
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