| 說明 |
xii, 239 pages ; 24 cm |
|
text txt rdacontent |
|
unmediated n rdamedia |
|
volume nc rdacarrier |
| 附註 |
Includes bibliographical reference (pages [225]-233) and index |
|
Acknowledgments. Introduction: what's at stake in the free will debate? Part 1 The teleological account of action : Teleology and interpretation -- Rationalizability and irrationality -- Other objections to the teleological account -- Rationalizing principles and causal explanation -- Deviant causal chains -- The commitments of common-sense psychology. Part 2 The teleological account of free will and responsibility : Application to free will: non-causal compatibilism -- Irrational actions and freedom -- Extraordinary cases -- How the teleological account undermines arguments for incompatibilism -- Epistemic problems for other accounts of free will -- Concluding thoughts. References -- Index |
|
Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon argues that we can make progress on these questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. Part I of the book proposes and defends a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behavior is irreducibly teleological rather than causal. Part II applies the teleological account of action to free will and responsibility, arguing that the free actions-the ones for which we are directly responsible. It is then argued that this non-causal account of action undermines the appeal of incompatibilist arguments, arguments attempting to show that free will is not compatible with determinism. Beyond this, Sehon argues that the non-causal compatibilist account works well in practice: it is in accord with our clear intuitions about cases, and it both explains and provides guidance in the cases where our intuitions are murkier |
| 主題 |
Free will and determinism
|
|
Explanation
|
|
Act (Philosophy)
|
|
